Defense in a Nuclear Age *The Editors*

THE NEW REPUBLIC

November 24, 1962, 35 cents

Thoughts on Inspection

Charles Burton Marshall

Sharing the Aid Burden

Christopher Willoughby

E. B. White Forever

Webster Schott

JFK's Front Yard

Wolf Von Eckardt

12-64 K26744 AR11-13-1
UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT
LIBRARY
BURLINGTON VT

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

T.R.B. *from Washington*

Hate-the-Governor

★ India is disillusioned with Peking, Latin America with Castro; the rift deepens between Moscow and Peking, and now Moscow and Washington have finished current nuclear tests. New power balances are temporarily conceivable. This could be the greatest hour of history since World War II. To Konrad Adenauer, Kennedy called it a "climactic period."

Meanwhile, on the domestic front, there is a new political development, the "hate the-governor" complex. The election showed voters everywhere making governors scapegoats for problems too big for states to solve. It is an outgrowth of the move to "turn things back to the states"; it means starving public services at the federal level and dumping responsibility on the inadequate states.

In 1960, Democrats took seven governorships from the GOP; the GOP took six from Democrats.

In 1962, the Democrats recaptured six, the GOP recaptured six, with the Minnesota outcome in doubt.

It was the same in the two elections: overturn without clear partisan pattern; voters were just angry at the ins.

Why doesn't the governor solve the state's problems? Because he can't: they are more and more national problems. He has unemployment let's say; but the decision between a stagnant or booming economy is made in Washington; he just gets the end result. Schools the same way – his state can't afford to build the schools it should but Congress won't help him out. Or suppose the governor meets the inevitable rising cost of urban living (as the public crams into cities) by higher taxes; how can he impose them painlessly? The federal government has first crack at the most lucrative money raisers: graduated corporate and individual income taxes, tariffs, cigarettes, liquor and gasoline. The governor's sales taxes are apt to be on showy things, like clothing.

There's a rough way of showing statistically where the shoe pinches. Federal indebtedness has increased only 10 percent recently (1953-61), but municipal debt has doubled and state debt has increased 2½ times. The states are just keeping their heads above water. But all the public tumult and shouting is about the "terrifying" federal debt which, of course, is large in the aggregate but not at all serious in relation to GNP and population. Per capita federal debt in 1946, for example, was $1862; at this time last year it was $1583; it had actually declined.

State governors must have curious feelings as they see the great burst of newspaper editorials beginning again about the size of the federal deficit and debt when they reflect on their own far more difficult problems. What editorialists really are asking, in most cases, is that the inevitable cost of necessary public services be transferred to their own localities, the cities and states.

Governors of the two biggest states, Rockefeller and Brown, weathered the storm, but with reduced majorities. Ohio's DiSalle had to raise taxes, it helped defeat him; the Democrats in Michigan and Pennsylvania had tax and unemployment problems; Romney and Scranton overthrew them. Can Romney and Scranton do any better? Their fate will depend a good deal on what the federal government does. In any case it will be hard for them to build up reputations in the next year to make them serious Presidential dark horses. It is in the big states that national problems bear down the hardest.

The Rich and the Rest

★ A lot of Americans, it seems, think the gap between the rich and the poor in this country is narrowing; at least Herman Miller, Bureau of the Census, says that's what he thinks people think, in a good article in last week's *New York Times* Sunday magazine section. Not so, says Miller, this is a "myth." Our favorite statistic on this subject is one that we have quoted before: As American income is presently distributed the top 5 percent of the population gets one-fifth of the income (before taxes); the lower one-fifth of the population gets about 5 percent. In times of prosperity and full employment the lower income group makes its stride forward; that happened in the World War II period when the gap was appreciably reduced. The gap between rich and poor stays stationary at times of half-steam economy, this covers the Eisenhower years and Kennedy's first two. In the past 10 years the gap has probably widened.

Two Parties in Dixie

★ The ingredient that is being left out of the growth of the so-called "two party" system in the South is the Negro voter. Analysis of the election shows that Republicans continued their slow progress; they added four House seats, making 14 out of 119 in the 13 Southern and border states. The word "Republican" is now respectable and even fashionable in the power elite in the South where it is equated with ultra-conservatism. A GOP reactionary almost defeated Sen. Lister Hill as too "soft" on segregation.

There will not be a true two-party system in the South unless the low-income masses (Negroes) get the vote, otherwise it is simply a competition between conservatives under different labels. Negro registration now runs about 25 percent of those of voting age and the percentage who vote is much smaller. Anyone who thought Goldwater-Republicanism would aid Negroes is mistaken; in the South it is the party of Abraham (Beauregard) Lincoln.

Notes

★ In his column, "The Magazine Rack," Al Horne points out that *Reader's Digest* entered 13 million homes on the eve of the election with a book condensation of the Richard Nixon version of the Hiss case, and a re-hash of the Bay of Pigs' Kennedy invasion fiasco. . . . Richard Dudman's *Men of the Far Right* is available for 50 cents from Pyramid Books, 444 Madison Ave., N. Y.; it covers the ultras from Billy James Hargis to Dan Smoot.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Opinion Volume 147 Number 21 Issue 2505 November 24, 1962*
Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, *1244 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Phone: FEderal 8-2494. Single copy 35c. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Advertising rates upon request. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Include old and new address.**Copyright© 1962, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.**Item g. Second class Imprint, reading Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C. Indexed in* Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Defense in a Nuclear Age

THE WEEK

3. Defense in a Nuclear Age; Berlin Next; Skeletons in the Senatorial Closet; Dismissed Public Servants; New Delhi and Moscow; Fidelismo in Chile; Parole for Sobell; What's Fit to Print

ARTICLES

10. The Spiegel Affair
by Terence Prittie
11. Ben Bella and the Communists
by Jean Daniel
13. The Superficial Aspect
by Gerald W. Johnson
14. Hide and Seek
by Charles Burton Marshall
17. Foreign Aid: Sharing the Burden
by Christopher Willoughby

DEPARTMENTS

21. Books 25. Feiffer 26. Movies
27. Architecture 29. Art
31. Correspondence

THE STAFF

Gilbert A. Harrison, Editor & Publisher
Selig S. Harrison, Managing Editor
Robert Evett, Books & the Arts Editor
Christopher Jencks, Associate Editor
James F. Ridgeway, Staff Writer
F. R. Ruskin, Assistant to the Publisher

Contributing Editors:

Alexander M. Bickel, Robert Brustein, Asher Brynes, Helen Fuller, Frank Getlein, B. H. Haggin, Morton H. Halperin, Irving Howe, Gerald W. Johnson, Stanley Kauffmann, Helen Hill Miller, Michael Straight

During the six anxious days between the President's demand that the Soviets remove their medium-range missiles from Cuba and Premier Khrushchev's acquiescence, the possibility of nuclear war was never far from consciousness. Yet there was a discrepancy between the public image of what the disaster would be and the kind of disaster which officials talked about. The difference was that while the public feared a Soviet nuclear attack on American cities, most defense specialists seemed to believe that if *nuclear* war came, the US would start it – either by using tactical nuclear weapons on a battlefield somewhere, or by using strategic weapons against Soviet forces where they might be located.

This is not to say that military experts dismissed entirely the possibility of an initial Soviet nuclear strike. Some thought that if the US enforced its blockade against a nuclear-armed Soviet submarine, or bombed Soviet missile bases in Cuba without knocking them all out, or attempted an invasion during which the Cubans gained control of the missiles, US cities might be hit. Other experts feared that the Soviets, knowing the Strategic Air Command to be on maximum alert and ready to strike against the USSR, might misread their radar screens, think that US rockets and bombers were on their way, and launch their own bombers and missiles lest these be destroyed on the ground. There were even those who guessed that the Soviet stake in Cuba was so great, and Kremlin politics so unstable, that Khrushchev might be unable to back down without losing his job, and might therefore see a nuclear strike as his only "way out."

Yet a Soviet nuclear strike made no sense. The US can today drop something like four times as much megatonnage in a first strike at the USSR as the USSR can drop in a first strike at the US. If the Soviets had hit first and had used most of their bombers and missiles against SAC, they would have emerged from the first nuclear exchange little stronger, and perhaps even weaker, *vis à vis* the US than before the exchange. They would have used up most of their missiles in a first strike; the bulk of those remaining would have been destroyed on their pads by our missiles and bombers. Most of the Soviet bombers would have been shot down or destroyed on the ground; the rest would have had their refueling and reloading bases destroyed. The Soviet intercontinental armory would, in short, have been almost exhausted. In contrast the US, because it started with more numerous, more mobile and "harder" forces, would still have had a formidable striking force, probably capable of annihilating every living thing in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russia if ordered to do so.

Knowing they could not neutralize SAC, Russian generals might have decided not to waste missiles trying. They might have thrown everything they had at US cities. But to what end? They would simply have ensured that almost everyone in the USSR was killed in revenge. Humiliating as it no doubt was for Khrushchev to retreat in Cuba, most US officials felt fairly confident, even at the height of the crisis, that it would be neither so humiliating nor so dangerous to him as a nuclear war.

So why all the anxiety last month? The answer is fairly simple. Although military and diplomatic experts did not expect a direct nuclear attack on the US, even in the event of an invasion of Cuba, they did envisage the possibility – some said the probability – of a Soviet counter-move elsewhere. The Soviets might have tightened the noose around Berlin; they might have intervened on behalf of the Kurdish rebels in Iraq. In neither of these settings, military analysts noted, could the US have brought enough conventional power to bear sufficiently fast to halt the Soviets. If it chose to defend these areas, the US would probably have had to use nuclear weapons – either tactically against Soviet ground forces and air cover, or strategically against missile and bomber bases in the USSR itself. The US would have hoped for an equally "limited" Soviet reply – a nuclear attack on US forces in Iraq or Berlin, or else against SAC, but not against US cities.

That would have been the hope; but many strategists were afraid the hope would not be fulfilled. They feared that neither the Soviet arsenal nor the Soviet brass was sufficiently flexible to make a "limited" reply. Any nuclear attack, they said, especially against targets in the USSR, whether bases or cities, might have impelled Kremlin leaders to use 10, 20 and 50 megaton bombs against US cities.

How Limited a Response?

When Khrushchev caught the US flying U-2's over Russia, he threatened to use nuclear rockets to destroy the bases from which they flew and the nations which provided the bases. And yet if Khrushchev had killed millions of people in reprisal, arguing that he was merely "defending" the Soviet Union, it is unlikely that history would have vindicated him.

US threats of massive or limited nuclear retaliation fall in somewhat the same category as Khrushchev's threats against U-2 bases. If the Soviets were to attack Turkey and the US were to respond by triggering nuclear war, destroying not only the US and USSR but Turkey in the process, the judgment of history would not be kind to the US. In this instance, to escalate from conventional to nuclear war is like hanging a man for stealing a horse. The threat of hanging may or may not be an effective "deterrent," but the act of hanging for such an offense is an outrage. The strategy of a peace-loving nation would be to keep the level of violence as low, not as high, as possible; to meet soldiers with soldiers, tanks with tanks.

The New Republic is not here advocating a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament. If, for example, the Soviet Union were to hit us with nuclear missiles, the very least the President could do to defend surviving Americans would be to destroy Soviet missile and bomber bases so they could not hit us a second time. But to build a second strike arsenal for this purpose, and to pledge to use it only in this way, is very different from building a first strike potential designed to answer not only nuclear but conventional aggression.

Suppose our country were to adopt such a "second strike only" nuclear policy. Would this, as Administration officials argue, invite Soviet or Chinese aggression in areas near their borders where they enjoy conventional superiority? Would we then have to write off Berlin, Turkey, Iran and so forth as "indefensible"? Fortunately, this would not be necessary.

The answer is to mobilize enough additional army divisions, with enough mobility, fire power and air support, to meet our obligations without resort to nuclear weapons. This is not impossible, whether the challenger be Russian or Chinese. America has substantial advantages over the Soviet Union and will for some years to come. Although our population is 10 percent smaller, we have a surplus of young unemployed workers; the USSR has a shortage. We need far fewer men on our farms than the Russians do. We have surplus industrial capacity which can be used to build the best equipped and most mobile army in the world; the Soviet Union has a shortage of industrial capacity. By making our Selective Service System somewhat less selective we could match the Soviet army man for man. Our NATO allies have three times the population and five or six times the economic resources of the Soviets' Warsaw Pact allies. In the Orient, while America's allies are neither as numerous nor as militant as the Chinese, there are severe limits on China's ability to transport and supply its troops beyond its own border. These limitations, coupled with American technological superiority, make it possible for the US to defeat the Chinese in a conventional war in Asia, or at least fight them to a standstill as we did in Korea.

But none of these things can be done unless America makes up its mind to do them. The President must have a firm determination to increase US conventional forces, so that they, combined with those of our allies, can match Communist conventional forces on any likely battlefield. He must explain to the American people that this is an important step in reducing the risk of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nuclear war, and he must resign himself to bitter criticism from Air Force generals, aircraft and missile manufacturers, and mothers who would rather see their sons employed as engineers in Santa Monica than as GI's in Fort Dix or Korea. So far, the President does not appear to have made such a decision.

John F. Kennedy came into office with a conviction that the Pentagon needed more of everything – more guerrillas, more soldiers, more mobility, more firepower, more missiles, more imagination. He raised everybody's budget. He did not announce at the outset any revisions in strategy, except to adopt somewhat tentatively the thesis that limited nuclear war could include attacks on Soviet strategic forces, such as ICBM's and long-range bombers, as well as attacks on Soviet battlefield forces.

The Crucial Choice

The President has not, so far as it can be determined, insisted to our allies in NATO or elsewhere that we must be able to meet conventional aggression with a conventional response. Only last week General Lauris Norstad, retiring commander of NATO, reiterated that if there is the slightest doubt about US readiness to resort to limited nuclear war when faced with a nonnuclear assault, "we have lost a great part of the deterrent effect."

Instead, he has told them, repeatedly, that the reason they should increase their conventional capabilities, as the US was increasing its own, was to assure a "pause" between a Soviet attack and our employment of nuclear weapons. During this "pause," the Administration argues, the Soviets might have second thoughts and pull back. The Europeans – and many Americans – are skeptical. So long as the Europeans believe that the US is ready and willing to "defend" Europe against the Red Army by nuclear means, they cannot be expected to order unpopular increases in their conventional forces – not when the purpose is merely to postpone nuclear destruction for a few days or weeks after war begins. If, on the other hand, US use of nuclear weapons were made contingent on their being employed first by the Communists, Europeans would have a much greater incentive to boost their conventional strength.

If the United States and its allies do not choose to mobilize sufficient conventional forces to meet their defense obligations around the world, then very serious thought should be given to reducing some of these obligations. If Berlin cannot be defended from conventional attack without resort to nuclear war, then one must ask whether it was wise to make the defense of that city, imbedded in Communist territory, the test of the West's willingness to fight. No great power can go to the brink every other month saying, in effect, "Don't push your advantage too hard, or we may blow up the world." The threat may work once, twice, three times. Repeated often enough, the threat is likely to be tested. To avoid this, the West must strengthen its conventional forces, and pledge itself not to use nuclear weapons first.

Berlin Next

The Adenauer talks in Washington do not seem to have produced any changes. No new diplomatic "initiative" on Berlin was forthcoming. Instead, there was agreement to wait until the dust has settled over Cuba, after which Russian intentions may be more accurately assessed. The reason for this procrastination could be simply that the Administration is still too occupied with Cuba. A more important reason may be that there are now only shades of difference between Bonn and Washington on a Berlin settlement.

Although official sources would not explain what the President had in mind when he referred last week, in Adenauer's presence, to a "turning point in East-West relations," it was obvious at least to Adenauer and his assistants that Kennedy was thinking of a shift in Soviet policies after the traumatic experience of the withdrawal from Cuba. If the Russians give any proof

Stormy Weather

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of a more conciliatory attitude in connection with Berlin – and they have begun to talk about it in a more restrained tone – agreement between Bonn and Washington on a "package deal" would not be hard to reach. There is already wide agreement between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Schroeder, certainly more than between Kennedy and Adenauer. But it is less likely that the Chancellor could veto proposals which have support within all three of the West German political parties.

Adenauer knows when he has to back down. In April he publicly denounced Washington's suggestion for an international authority to supervise rights of military and civil access to Berlin; now he has accepted it completely. The proposed composition of this authority has been slightly altered to meet Bonn's objections to "recognizing" East Germany; the four German participants (Bonn and Pankow, West and East Berlin) would have only an advisory role. But the concept of a 13-member international body composed of the four big powers, plus neutrals, is still alive. Up to now, the Russians have shown little interest in it, but it offers a way out if they are looking for one: it does acknowledge the existence of the East German state.

The other proposals on Berlin, all but one of American origin and now accepted by Bonn *if* the Russians show "good will," are:

– Non-aggression pledges between NATO and the Warsaw pact, which in fact provide a kind of guarantee for East Germany.

– Assurances that no existing frontiers will be changed by force, which is a veiled recognition of the Oder-Neisse border.

– Agreement to prevent the spread of weapons, though this would not affect the NATO deterrent in which Bonn is still much interested.

– All-German committees as a means of bringing the two halves of Germany together. (Bonn is skeptical, but goes along.)

– Finally a permanent conference of deputies of foreign ministers to supervise the arrangements on Berlin and to deal with questions relating to reunification generally. (This is a German suggestion.)

These proposals look more innocent on the surface than they are from the official German viewpoint. If adopted, they would forever bury the idea trying to reunify the country through forcing the Russians to withdraw from East Germany. This idea was and is the bedrock of Adenauer's whole foreign policy. It is not, however, the basis for policies of the younger generation of politicians like Schroeder, Willy Brandt or Erich Mende of the Free Democrats.

Skeletons in the Senatorial Closet

The following colloquy between Senator Eastland of Mississippi and Senator Ellender of Louisiana took place on the floor of the United States Senate, August 24, 1960:

Mr. Eastland: Is it not true that Trujillo has been a friend of the United States?
Mr. Ellender: I do not believe there is any doubt about that. . . . There is not one country in South or Central America which, since 1952, has shown greater economic progress than the Dominican Republic.
Mr. Eastland: Did the Senator from Louisiana find that the people there were happy and contented?
Mr. Ellender: I saw no evidence of unrest. . . .
Mr. Eastland: Is it not true . . . that Trujillo has given the country stability – something it never had before?
Mr. Ellender: There is no question about that.
Mr. Eastland: Is it not also true that it takes a strong arm to rule in countries of that sort . . . ?
Mr. Ellender: That is certainly true in many instances.
Mr. Eastland: If it were destroyed and if a vacuum were left, who would march in?
Mr. Ellender: Another Castro, without a doubt.
Mr. Eastland: Is not Trujillo the foremost enemy of Communism in Latin America?
Mr. Ellender: I never met anyone there who so often and vocally professed his opposition to Communism.

Last week, a reporter visited the Dominican Republic and interviewed Rafael Valera Benitez, the 34-year-old prosecutor who has "the grim and dangerous job of uncovering the trail of murder and mayhem bequeathed by Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo."

The prosecutor is quoted by Dom Bonafede of the *Miami Herald* as follows: "How many people did Trujillo kill? At least 100,000 – and probably many thousands more during his 30-year rule. As to how many were beaten and tortured, it is impossible to even guess but there are few families who have not had one relative among the victims. It is like walking over a field of skeletons."

Dismissed Public Servants

As he stormed off the political stage, the former Vice President, Richard Nixon, told the press of his "wish that you had given my opponent the same going over that you gave me. . . . I leave you gentlemen now and you will now write it. You will interpret it. That's your right. But as I leave you I want you to know – just think how much you're going to be missing. You won't have Nixon to kick around any more, because, gentlemen, this is my last press conference. . . ."

Consider Sir Winston Churchill's farewell after his dismissal by the British electorate in 1945: "The decision of the British people has been recorded in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

votes counted today. I have therefore laid down the charge which was placed upon me in darker times. I regret that I was not permitted to finish the work against Japan. For this, however, all plans and preparations have been made, and the results may come much quicker than we have hitherto been entitled to expect. Immense responsibilities abroad and at home fall upon the new government, and we must all hope that they will be successful in bearing them. It only remains for me to express to the British people, for whom I have acted in these perilous years, my profound gratitude for the unflinching, unswerving support . . . they have given me during my task, and for the many expressions of kindness . . . they have shown their servant."

New Delhi and Moscow

After initial threats to renege on its promise of MIG-21 supersonic aircraft if India turned to the US, Britain and Canada for emergency military assistance, the Soviet Union appeared to have some second thoughts last week. Prime Minister Nehru has yet to indicate how many planes will be delivered, or when, but he told Parliament on November 9 that the Russians "have assured us that they will be delivered." By implication, he suggested that Moscow had promised that the deliveries would be made on schedule next month and that certain other marginal military commitments (spare parts for Soviet-supplied helicopters) made before the stepped-up October Chinese offensive would be honored. Though the Russians themselves maintain a studied official silence, the consensus in New Delhi appears to be that Mr. Nehru is speaking on the strength of what has reportedly been an intense personal correspondence with Mr. Khrushchev. Moscow is expected to send a token half dozen of the promised aircraft, while easing out of discussions concerning technical help for Indian manufacture of the MIG-21.

There have been other signs of a Soviet effort to moderate the impact of their October 24 shift from long-standing neutrality in the Indo-Chinese border conflict to support for "fraternal" China over "friendly" India. Backing away from its endorsement of the Chinese version of an equitable cease-fire, *Pravda* left its stand notably ambiguous in a November 5 comment on the boundary question. On November 7, the Soviet First Deputy Premier, Alexei Kosygin, "deeply regretted events on the Chinese-Indian border . . . which benefit only the imperialists" and spoke of "a reasonable basis" for a settlement without reference to Chinese claims. As if to serve notice that Soviet economic aid to India would not be affected by the Chinese campaign to enforce Communist solidarity on the border issue, the Russians, who are customarily (as the *New York Times* put it) "exceedingly sparing in the grant of foreign consular rights outside Moscow," suddenly gave permission on November 13 for the Indians to open a consular office in Odessa to serve Indian ships arriving in the Black Sea port to pick up Soviet aid shipments. The Chinese, meanwhile, were intensifying their public attacks on Soviet policies in India and Cuba. Peking has recalled its ambassadors in Asian, African and Latin American capitals for conferences. This move is linked to the new Chinese bid for supremacy within non-European Communist parties, a bid signalled by the Tenth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Central Committee in September.

Mr. Nehru has gone out of his way to keep the door open to a continuing close relationship with Moscow and thus to preserve the basis of his nonalignment policy. "We shall not treat this war as a war against Communism," he said on November 10. "This is simply a war between India and China, and we are not going to be pressured into describing it otherwise." To some extent he was dressing down political opponents who are trying to use the war crisis to push Congress Party domestic policies in a Rightist direction. But when he labels Chinese aggression a manifestation of traditional Han imperialism rather than the inevitable expansionism of a Communist regime, and when, in particular, he notes the "undefined" character of the border between the Soviet Union and China in Central Asia, he is addressing himself primarily to Moscow and appealing to the Russians to behave in terms of Russian national interest rather than as partners of Peking. His tactics may be in vain, but the West would have everything to gain from their success.

Fidelismo in Cuba

While the Cuban crisis continues to simmer along at a somewhat lowered temperature, distress signals are wagging far to the south, in Chile. The measure of that country's economic and political health is the value of the *escudo*, a new unit of currency introduced four years ago after the old *peso* declined to less than one-tenth of a cent. Chilean President Alessandri staked his political reputation on keeping the *escudo* on a par with the dollar, and precariously managed to do so until this year. But now, with a trade deficit of $150 million and $160 million a year required to amortize public and private debt abroad, the government has had to give way. The *escudo* has slid to 50 cents and may drop further; during the first six months of this year 60 percent of all dollar deposits held by individuals were withdrawn from Chilean banks (despite an interest rate of eight percent).

Chile thus threatened with economic collapse is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

otherwise one of the most stable nations in Latin America and one of the most promising beneficiaries of the Alliance for Progress. Eighty percent of the population is literate, and almost all of it of European origin. The press is reasonably free and vigorous. The armed forces, while larger than they need to be, are professionals and have permitted peaceful rule by the political parties since 1931. Although Chile has so far refused to break relations with Cuba, no Latin nation has a more convincing record of cooperation with the US.

But behind this pleasing façade there lurk the same ugly realities that are bedeviling Chile's neighbors. From two-thirds to three-quarters of the nation's foreign exchange is brought in by copper exports, 90 percent of them produced by Kennecott and Anaconda; and copper is down to 29 cents a pound, as against a 1956 high of 46 cents. Some 3,500 families own 75 percent of all the arable land; 180,000 low income farmers own less than one percent (and must borrow money at interest rates of four percent a month to buy seed and supplies). A third of the population are landless tenants and sharecroppers, whose average wage is $1 a day. Much of the farmland lies idle, though the nation imports $100 million of food every year; thousands of *rotos* (broken ones) drift into the slums of Santiago, where they fall victim to intestinal diseases and tuberculosis. A recent UN survey placed Chile fourth highest in the world with regard to infant mortality, exceeded only by Egypt, Ecuador and Venezuela.

The *gente-decente* who control the governing conservative coalition have responded indifferently to US demands for tax and land reform. When an Agrarian Reform bill was introduced in the Chilean Congress this year (after four years of study) it was watered down with 69 amendments and Congress reserved the right to veto members of the board that is to carry out the reform. "Model farms," whose production is held to be satisfactory, will not be expropriated (though some of them run up to 25,000 acres or more).

Waiting impatiently in the wings with a program of its own is the FRAP, a Popular Front coalition of Socialists and Communists which came within 30,000 votes of winning the 1958 Presidential elections and which now holds 53 of 192 seats in the lower house. Salvador Allende, the FRAP's Socialist nominee for next year's race, has supported the "irrevocable" Cuban revolution, and is campaigning on a platform that sounds like Fidel's (except for the absence of dictatorship): breaking up the large estates, expropriation of the copper companies and the Chilean subsidiaries of IT&T and Electric Bond & Share, and massive trade agreements with the USSR. His chances at the moment seem only fair, but leftist sentiment is rising along with the cost of living; and the Chilean army, unlike its Peruvian and Argentine brothers, is not likely to upset the result of an honest election. The emergence of a quasi-Communist regime on the South American mainland as a result of the democratic process would confront the US with a situation more difficult to deal with than the irksome totalitarian regime in Cuba.

Parole for Sobell

The US Board of Parole recently held a hearing in Washington on the pros and cons of releasing a convicted Soviet spy. Nobody showed up con, but some 15 persons came to make statements pro, including two law professors, five clergymen, one psychologist and one journalist (Dwight Macdonald). Supporting statements were sent in by Professor Malcolm Sharp of the Chicago Law School and Sir Charles P. Snow.

Morton Sobell was tried for espionage in 1950 with the Rosenbergs who were sentenced to death and later executed. The judge gave Sobell 30 years. Without raising the question of guilt or innocence – though it must be said that the evidence against the Rosenbergs was much stronger than that against Sobell – both sentences were excessive and can only be explained by the fact that the Korean War was in progress and McCarthy was just going into business. (The trial judge actually charged the Rosenbergs with being responsible for "casualties exceeding 50,000" in Korea.) The sentences were vindictive compared to the 14 years the British courts gave Klaus Fuchs, who passed on to the Russians data of far greater importance, and the 10 years they gave another atomic spy, Allen Nunn May. In Sobell's case, it was not even claimed by the prosecution he had anything to do with atomic espionage: "The evidence did not point to any activity on your part in connection with the atom bomb project," Judge Samuel Kaufman stated in sentencing him.

What precisely Sobell did do is not clear from the court record; according to the one witness against him, Max Elitcher, he tried to get others to pass on information, but whether successfully or not does not appear. His connection with the Rosenbergs was tenuous and in normal times he would not have been tried with them. In his dissenting opinion, the late Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Sobell should for this reason be given a new, and separate, trial.

Morton Sobell has served 12 years in prison – five of them in Alcatraz. He is now eligible for parole. The two chief criteria for granting or withholding parole are the prison record and the chances for "rehabilitation" after release – "the general well-being of society." Sobell has been a model prisoner, going beyond mere passive "good conduct" to make such positive contributions as working on an electronic substi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tute for Braille, developing an adaptor that saved the Atlanta penitentiary money in its purchases of electronic tubes, and writing on satellites and other scientific subjects for the prison magazine. As for "rehabilitation," he has employment waiting for him as well as a devoted family. The pleas of his mother, wife and teenage son at the parole hearing were affecting: the mother asked that he be released "before it is too late"; the son, Mark, said "I'd like you to free my father so that I would have a family to come home to like my friends have," adding, in reference to the Alcatraz years: "When I was little I only saw my father through a glass wall and I had to talk to him on a telephone." (He spoke up steadily to the parole board, though later, in the corridor, he was in tears.) In short, there is no reason to believe that "the general well-being of society" would not be advanced by Sobell's being paroled. Twelve years is more than ample sentence for the crime he was accused of.

The board, or somebody among the powers that be, might also consider the cases of two other prisoners: that of Junius Scales, who is serving a six-year sentence under the Smith Act for failing to register as a Communist although he had resigned from the party, disillusioned, before he was indicted; and that of Harry Gold, who pleaded guilty to espionage and cooperated with the government and who is now serving a 30-year sentence (although the prosecution had asked for only 15 years).

What's Fit to Print

Not 18 months ago the President was complaining that the press should exercise restraint in telling the American people the truth about the Bay of Pigs; now the press is complaining because the Administration exercised restraint in telling them the truth about the Cuban blockade. After Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, had admitted to manipulating the flow of news so that America would speak "in one voice to our adversary," the *New York Times* editorialized that this could be "far more dangerous to the cause of freedom . . . than the fullest possible publication of the facts."

Are we in danger of being brain-washed by bureaucracy? No more, it seems to us, than at any other time since mass communication came to America. No doubt the President did tell reporters that he was primarly concerned about Berlin, not Cuba, seven hours *after* seeing the first reconnaissance photos; Mr. Salinger did say that the President was returning to Washington because of a cold he didn't have; the Pentagon did suggest first that massing Marines in Florida was part of a "normal exercise," and later that they were massed there because the President was considering an invasion if the Kremlin did not capitulate within a couple of days (which he wasn't). But such statements are, as Sylvester explained, a way of throwing an adversary off balance – including (as he did not explain) domestic adversaries of the Administration who had been demanding a "tougher" line.

What is noteworthy about the handling of the Cuban story is not so much the government's behavior as that of the press. Sylvester's candid acknowledgement that the government used its power to further national policy was editorially criticized by the *Washington Post*. Yet the *Post* itself, the morning after the blockade was announced, featured on its front pages a "news analysis" which began: "Soviet missiles in Cuba are today's equivalent of Hitler's march into the Rhineland." The official line was thereby echoed, but at what cost to accuracy?

Not one of the Administration's diversionary or deceptive "leaks" or announcements last month was exposed until after it had ceased to matter. In many cases the press participated in the deception: the *New York Times*, for example, knew on good authority that the President had no cold when he returned to Washington. It agreed, however, to print the official story, merely hinting that it was perhaps not true. Again, the *Times* reported that "several newspapers learned the nature of the threat that was seen by the government" in Cuba (and those "several newspapers" surely included the *Times*). But at the request of the White House, the *Times* went on to say, the papers agreed to suppress the news until the President chose to make it public.

Most journalists accept the responsibility of protecting "the national interest" when the threat to that interest is beyond reasonable doubt (*i.e.*, not publishing secret military plans); but there is a reasonable doubt whether the same duty obliged the press, at the time of the blockade announcement, to take the government's word for what was fit to print.

Once the crisis came out into the open the *Times*, like other good newspapers, did its best to print every theory and fact relayed to its large Washington staff. The result was quantity somewhat at the expense of clarity. Only one or two reporters on the *Times* discriminated among the innumerable facts and theories, discounting those which were untrue or doubtful and giving the reader as objective an account as possible of the fast-developing story. For the most part reporters attended briefings and recorded the "not for attribution" views of top officials, rarely letting the reader in on the fact that officials usually speak with one eye on the facts and one eye on the way the next morning's newspapers will be interpreted in Moscow – and Dubuque.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UPROAR OVER PUBLICATION OF "SECRET" INFORMATION

The Spiegel Affair

Bonn

The *Spiegel* affair – involving the seizure of that weekly paper's offices in Hamburg by the police and the arrest of five leading members of its staff – is about to enter its second and decisive phase. The first phase has concerned the Federal Government's methods of organizing an inquiry into the affairs of this rollicking and sometimes obstreperous weekly – an inquiry based on the suspicion of treason and bribery on the part of members of its staff. The second phase will have to do with the framing and pressing of charges against the paper's publisher, Rudolph Augstein, and his assistants. It can be said at once that the first phase has cast no credit on the Federal Government, which has already had to dismiss one Undersecretary of State and has sent another on indefinite leave of absence. But the second phase could be far more dangerous for Adenauer and his Ministers.

After the first 14 days of the *Spiegel* affair a totally unbiased observer has to admit that the government inquiry has been shockingly bungled. Over the past two years the *Spiegel* has fought a series of lawsuits with the Federal Minister of Defense, Herr Strauss, which have brought displays of bad temper on both sides. The blame for this squalid feud can be fairly divided between the bucolic Minister and the insidiously aggressive management of the *Spiegel*. But the Minister, at least, should have known better than to engage in a rough and tumble with a paper which can only profit from his bull-headedness.

The provocation for the government's recent action was the publication on October 10 of a full account of a recent "Secret" NATO exercise "Fallex 62." The offending article detailed the failure of West Germany to participate effectively in the maneuvers, and the general inability of the NATO forces in these war games to repulse a Communist attack without resorting to tactical nuclear weapons. The maneuvers were based on the assumption of a large-scale attack on Europe, signalling the start of World War III. Though Russian attacks failed to eliminate NATO's retaliatory weapons – two thirds of the delivery systems remained intact – the chaos in Europe was unimaginable, and in itself hindered the advance of Communist troops. NATO forces lacking sufficient troops were unable to stop the advance, and sizable territory in northwest Germany was occupied. The maneuvers demonstrated, the *Spiegel* article reported, that the Federal Republic's defense preparations, after seven years of rearmament, are totally inadequate. While "Fallex 62" showed that Army groups in Europe were ready within two hours with 85 percent of their troops battle-ready, the nine mobile divisions of the Bundeswehr, which respond to NATO command, were not complete in personnel; weapons and equipment were lacking. Army doctors posts were only one quarter filled. Hundreds of thousands of reservists reporting for duty in the war games found no arms, and no officers. In addition, preparations for sanitation, medical care, medical supplies, food supplies, and air raid shelter, all were insufficient.

The government was incensed by the unauthorized disclosure. Yet one might have expected it to conduct its inquiry in a scrupulously correct manner. Instead, it allowed, perhaps encouraged, the State Prosecutor's Office to arrest members of the paper's staff in the middle of the night of October 26-27. The only explanation given so far is that a junior member of the staff was arrested by mistake on the evening of October 26. Yet this is not an "explanation" at all; the roping-in of this man at 6:30 p.m. only showed that the police were already beginning their round-up.

Secondly, the government had a member of the *Spiegel's* staff, Herr Conrad Ahlers, arrested in Spain by a process which the Ministers of Defense and the Interior both admitted on November 8 was not strictly legal. He was arrested by the Spanish police at Torremolinos, after they had been informed of his whereabouts by the West German Military Attaché in Madrid, Colonel Achim Oster. The latter was given his instructions by the Federal Defense Ministry at 2 a.m. on the morning of October 27. Ahlers and his wife were arrested at 6 a.m.

The Defense Ministry concealed this information for 13 days. In the meantime the Spanish Government felt impelled to produce an explanation of its own, which was that it had received a telegram at around 2 a.m. on the morning of October 27, giving details of the charges against Ahlers, from the West German section of Interpol at Weisbaden. The Defense Ministry may have hoped to avoid making any statement at all, and in this way not embarrass the Franco regime which had acted so promptly in its aid. In any event, the Spanish Government has been embarrassed and the truth, or part of the truth, has been dragged out of the Federal Government.

In the third place, the Defense Ministry at first disclaimed any part whatever in the proceedings; yet not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only did it organize the arrest of Ahlers (the author of the offending article on "Fallex 62"), but Strauss' Undersecretary of State, Herr Hopf, was responsible for informing the Ministry of Justice in Bonn that action was being taken against the *Spiegel*. It seems almost certain that Hopf made a point of telling only the Christion Democratic Undersecretary of State, and not the Free Democratic Minister. The latter has since said that he would not have permitted the police action to be carried out in such a ham-handed way.

Fourth, the police were still occupying all the principal offices in the *Spiegel's* building in Hamburg two weeks later. They claimed that this was necessary where treason was suspected. They also confiscated the galley-proofs of the October 31 issue of the paper and warned the acting editor against making any reference to the police action as a whole in the November 7 issue. The West German press and public have been alarmed by what appeared to be a limitation of the freedom of the press.

Finally, Dr. Adenauer set a lamentable example. In the Bundestag debate of November 7 the Chancellor sought to play down the whole affair but was sufficiently jolted out of his flippant mood to declare that it was "immaterial" whether a German citizen were arrested in Hamburg or Malaga, and that the *Spiegel's* publisher was making money out of treason. One Christian Democratic spokesman after another tried to show that any steps were justifiable where treason was concerned.

It is unethical to prejudge the case against the *Spiegel* for treason and bribery – even though Dr. Adenauer did so in a most flagrant way in the Bundestag. It must be said, however, that only one government servant was arrested in the first fortnight, Colonel Adolf Wicht of the *Bundeswehr* counter-intelligence service. The only grounds given for Wicht's arrest was that he informed the *Spiegel* that a police action was going to be taken against it. The State Prosecutor's office has so far produced only one or two unimportant details of notes made by Herr Augstein about information which was confidential and which he wanted to acquire. There is no indication yet as to whom the *Spiegel* may have bribed. After two weeks no charges had been brought against the five imprisoned members of the paper's staff; they were still only "under suspicion" and in a state of "interrogatory arrest."

What, then, can be made of the *Spiegel* affair at this stage? Three interim conclusions, at least, can be drawn. The *Spiegel* affair, in the first place, is basically significant, for it involves the governments understanding – or lack of it – of the rule of law and of the need to inform public opinion truthfully and punctually. The government has failed badly in both of these respects. In the second place, the Christian Democratic-Free Democratic majority in the Bundestag has displayed a disturbingly sheeplike conformism, supporting the government "line," come what may. Only two dissented, out of nearly 300.

The third conclusion is positive. The Social Democrats the Trade Unions, the various students and journalistic associations and a host of private persons protested vigorously against what they regarded as official high-handedness. This bodes well for West German democracy, but less well for Dr. Adenauer, Herr Strauss and those others who have indicated that governments too long in power may forget the feelings of their electors.

Terence Prittie

WHOSE REVOLUTION WILL PREVAIL IN ALGERIA?

Ben Bella and the Communists

Paris

The most recent statements of the chief of the Algerian Government, Mr. Ben Bella, are in fact warnings beamed at the Communist Party. He has denounced the demagogy of those who complain that Algeria's solidarity with Cuba is too "lukewarm" and who are making their press freely available as a mouthpiece for all the malcontents and the disgruntled.

Now, the only newspaper which falls in this category is *Alger Républicain*, an organ of the Algerian Communist Party which consistently outdoes Ben Bella in its strong pro-Cuban stand and which is setting itself up as a sounding-board for all protests against administrative sloppiness, and the rising tide of poverty, unemployment and disorder.

Mr. Ben Bella has appealed to all members of the Communist Party to rally behind one, and only one Party: the National Liberation Front (FLN). He implies that the trend is progressively in the direction of a single Party as the only feasible mechanism for restoring order in an underdeveloped nation. This

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

single Party would eventually bring about the elimination of the Communist Party; and indeed, according to Mr. Ben Bella, this is only logical, since the goal of the Algerian Government is socialism without subservience to the Soviet Union. Ben Bella has declared himself in favor of a strictly Algerian socialism, one which makes its own independent decisions and has a more natural affinity with the Arab, the Mediterranean, or the African world than with Russia or China.

The Communist Party has never played a very significant role in Algeria. Even during the colonial period it was merely a branch of the powerful French Communist Party. For many years Mr. Amar Ouzegane, the present Minister of Agriculture, served it as secretary-general, but he was expelled from the party in 1947 on grounds of "deviationism." Later, Mr. Ouzegane wrote a book in which he said that the Communists had never understood the Algerian situation because they failed to take into account traditional Arab and Islamic factors. Today, Ouzegane is considered to be the source of Ben Bella's attitude toward the party.

During the Algerian War the Communists tried to set up an independent guerrilla force, but at that time they were mercilessly prosecuted by the FLN. Next, they decided to accept an offer to break with the French party and affiliate separately with the FLN. Their prestige had shot up suddenly, owing to the publicity accorded the heroic exploits of one of their adherents – Henri Alleg, Algerian by adoption, a Jew by religion, a Hungarian by origin and famous as the author of *La Question*, a work which was translated into 12 languages and which described the torture inflicted on Algerians by French parachute troops.

And yet this very Henri Alleg found it difficult to get back into Algeria after his escape from a French prison and his sojourn in Czechoslovakia. At the very time the Algerian Government was receiving congratulations from the Chinese and the Russians and aid from the Czechs, Algerian Communists were unable to reenter their liberated homeland and publish their newspaper there. Several Communist governments interceded on their behalf, but in vain. Ultimately, however, they were given the necessary authorization, apparently because in official FLN circles it was believed that the Communists were neither popular nor dangerous, and that they could not attract any real audience.

This reasoning would have been accurate if everything had gone smoothly in Algeria after the proclamation of independence. But the breaking up of the FLN, the turning of brother against brother, the threat of civil war, the victory of one camp over the other only at the price of mass liquidations, and finally and most important, the frightful economic situation – all these circumstances were turned to advantage by the Communist Party and its organ, *Alger Républicain*. Although party membership was not overwhelming, it was still rather numerous; moreover, the only organized haven the opposition groups were able to find was under the wing of the Communist Party.

From the moment he returned from New York and Havana, Ben Bella sensed the danger of being overtaken by elements to the Left of him. He has just banned a conference of journalists of the Algerian Communist Party. To my knowledge this is the first time his government has prohibited a public meeting, and it is significant that the Communists are the first victims. Although expressing solidarity with the Cubans, he nevertheless publicly admitted that the Cuban revolution had committed "some blunders" and at the November 1 Independence celebrations he stressed to President Kennedy's representatives the fact that his invitation to go to Havana was of long standing and that, besides, he was among those who had inspired U Thant to take the initiative in writing to Khrushchev and Kennedy.

"Some day I shall disclose what our solidarity with Cuba has cost me," Ben Bella told a progressive journalist. The allusion is not clear, since the American Government has not reduced its aid to Algeria, and any failure to begin economic negotiations rests entirely with the Algerians. Certainly Ben Bella would like to maintain relations with the West, at least to the extent that this is feasible; in other words, to the extent that the West will understand that Ben Bella is committed to carry out certain revolutionary measures: agrarian reform, nationalization, negotiations with governments rather than with private companies, the acceptance of aid only if such aid is without political strings, solidarity with the uncommitted countries, and manifestations of gratitude toward those who helped his cause.

Even if he were reluctant to carry out these measures, Ben Bella would find it impossible not to put them into effect. For should he fail to do so, someone else would. If he does succeed in putting across this program, it will then be possible for him to justify single-Party control and the elimination of the Communist Party.

JEAN DANIEL

L'Express Banned

Two weeks ago, Ben Bella banned the newspaper of which Jean Daniel is foreign editor (L'Express) *from Algeria for one year. The action has stirred up resentment throughout the French Algerian and North African community.* L'Express *had been seized more than once by the French Government during the Algerian struggle and had earned a reputation, at considerable cost, of having contributed significantly to the final victory of the Algerian independence movement.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Plebiscite Without a Mandate

Meditation, cogitation and prayer lead this superficial observer to a firm conviction that the Democratic Party, hardly less than the Republican, has come unstuck. Not even "the cohesive power of public plunder," to say nothing of gummed labels, seems able any longer to hold either organization together.

We elected a Congress on the 6th of November, but what kind of Congress the most pontifical of the Chaldeans and soothsayers will not risk his reputation by saying. It includes such Democrats as Eastland and Morse, and such Republicans as Javits and Goldwater; and when you have said that, you have obfuscated the issue beyond hope of clarification.

In the West "with hideous ruin and combustion," Nixon went down; but at the same moment in the East Scranton was rising, smiling and affable. Nixon's castigation of the press is perhaps understandable as the natural reaction of a poor loser; but why did Tawes, a winner in Maryland, also castigate the press, most of which had supported him? Obviously, there is some confusion of mind among the politicians; the professionals no longer think along the same lines.

They act like men who have promised to get going, but have nowhere to go. This is confirmed by the pundits. At cross-purposes on all else, they do agree that this was a plebiscite without a mandate, an election that could mean anything and therefore actually means nothing.

But a doubt lingers. Isn't it possible that the refusal of the electorate to issue a mandate is in itself highly significant? It is at least conceivable that the refusal is based, not on apathy, but rather on a resentment mainly subconscious. Voters went to the polls in enormous numbers, which belies the suggestion of apathy; *vox populi* spoke loudly enough, in all conscience, but what it said sound like "eenie, meenie, miny mo," the children's formula for chance selection.

When you come right down to it, why should the public issue mandates? Ours is supposed to be a representative democracy, the theory of which is that we choose specially qualified persons to run the government. Well, why don't they run it? What do we pay these bums for? Waiting for a mandate is passing the buck to us when a difficult decision has to be made.

Of course we reserve the right of veto. If the policies adopted by our representatives are obviously idiotic it is our right and our duty to bounce the lot, and replace them with others who, we hope, can handle the job. But it is a degradation of the theory of representative democracy to assume that it means puppet government, dancing to strings manipulated by the electorate. We hold puppet government in derision when the manipulator of the strings is a dictator; but the ridiculous element is not the dictator, the holder of the strings. It is the dancing puppets.

More than seven, seventy times seven vials of wrath have been poured out on the concept of a "rubber-stamp Congress." But a rubber-stamp Congress is preferable to a completely undisciplined, directionless Congress. The last one missed that classification by a narrow margin. It did manage to put through a few items of a consistent program, but more, it seems plain enough, for the purpose of consolidating the political gains of the party than because Congress had evolved a consistent program of its own.

The betting now is that the newly-elected Congress will be worse than its predecessor in that respect. The chance that his own party will give the President solid support apparently has been reduced; but the chance that the Democrats in Congress will evolve an alternative program of their own has been reduced to the point of invisibility. The danger is not so much that the government will move in the wrong direction as that it will hang on dead center, unable to move at all.

But it can be plausibly argued that in the existing situation movement in any direction whatever may be better than no movement at all. For instance, in the Cuban affair the President, with whom the decision rested, moved in the direction of war, a most dangerous move; but two weeks later our situation was not worse, it was distinctly better than it would have been had he made no move at all. Yet is it conceivable he would ever have been given a mandate to move in that direction?

Ideas are produced first by individuals. There is that much solid support under the philosophy of authoritarian government. Democracy can work successfully only when its mechanism is adjusted to support the good idea of some individual. The late election raises a question as to whether ours is so adjusted. It seems to have come unstuck; which is bad business.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hide and Seek

Some Dour Thoughts on Inspection

by Charles Burton Marshall

Some key terms relevant to arms control and disarmament – a field of endeavor overburdened with ambiguities – have been mauled about by government spokesmen, news analysts and editorial writers since the onset of our troubles over missiles in Cuba. I feel prompted to offer, on behalf of rigor, some simple definitions. I begin with the generic term, *verification*.

One kind of verification can be carried out without the acquiescence or cooperation of the government subject to check. Certain information is explicit in, or inferable from, open sources within the country, from covert operations within or over the domain concerned, and from observations from adjacent territory. An appropriate term for this kind of verification is *monitoring*.

A second kind of verification requires grant of access by a government whose actions or capabilities are assessed. The operations divide into two classes.

One sort of access is that conceded by a government for a specific limited occasion. Outside authority is permitted to enter an area to confirm that the inviting government has done what it claims to have done (*e.g.* dismantled a missile pad). The visitors have no warrant to ferret out unreported matters. In effect the government is host, the outside authority is guest. An appropriate term here is *authentication*.

A contrasting sort of access is exercised when a government vests an outside authority with power not merely to check matters admitted by the subject government but also and essentially to determine, within limits of relevance, what may have been left undone or done covertly. The correct term here is *inspection*. Such is its sense in official parlance generally – in banking, postal operations, military outfits and so on. An inspector comes around, welcome or not, with warrant to poke and to raise issues – not merely to nod through a prearranged checklist.

The general concept, *verification*, is what was alluded to in Chairman Khrushchev's offer to take his missiles out of Cuba – concurred in at once by President Kennedy, subject to a proviso for continuing US monitoring in an interim. US spokesmen immediately began calling the prospective operation inspection. But by any feat of imagination, the essential attributes of inspection were lacking. Nevertheless, US officials, having espoused inspection through drudging years of talks on test bans and arms limitation, appeared anxious to nudge arrangements toward at least nominal or symbolic conformity to this standard. With equal alertness to record and precedent, the Soviets set out to attribute an invitational and pro-forma character to whatever, if anything, had been agreed to.

For an outsider, an analysis of the ensuing exercise in tactical diplomacy revolving around these opposed themes is highly difficult – much like trying to comprehend a merry-go-round by glimpsing it in motion through a fence crack, or a score of counterpoint by hearing gust-borne sounds of a distant orchestra. Who and what prompted U Thant to the pilgrimage that resulted in establishing a UN absence in Havana? On the basis of what estimates did the USSR propose and did the US hasten to accept the impeccably humanitarian International Committee of the Red Cross as a verifying agent on matters of war technology outside its familiarity? Were Castro's dissents at the instance, by leave, or in defiance of Moscow? Perhaps the explanations of these and many other mysteries will never be known.

One matter seems fairly evident, however: both sides have been doing their cagey utmost to avoid precedents and to minimize compromising basic positions on verification. As an augury for the 18-nation disarmament conference scheduled to resume soon in Geneva, this maneuvering is probably much more significant than the fervent pieties about disarmament exchanged between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy at the peak of the crisis.

Here, at risk of elaborating what is evident, I want to emphasize that the main parties to negotiation at Geneva are the governing groups in the US and the USSR. Their views do not necessarily coincide – and in some aspects are not at all likely to coincide – with the views found in literature on arms control. This literature is written by psychiatrists and sociologists intent upon resolving policy conflicts by dismissing them as aberrant, by physicists disposed to evaluate an adversary government's aims from senti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mentalities uttered over cocktails at a Pugwash meeting, by psychologists seeking clues to the weapons riddle by analyzing chit-chat of train attendants and of concierges met during a Russian tour, and by various other sorts of imaginative but nonresponsible authors.

The governing groups in the US and the USSR are aware of the chances for calamity. A shared desire to get armaments under control may be assumed without arguing, for on any other premise the negotiations consist of subterfuge and fall beyond rational analysis. Arms control and disarmament, however, are not absolute and discrete aims. They overlap and interact with a great range of other considerations. The rub is – or at least has been up to now – with respect to these other matters.

A bargain, if and when arrived at, must be a *political* one, in the broadest sense. Each party is under constraint to ensure terms which will preserve the order of values basic to its polity. As a test of their providence, the terms must have convincing marks of being provident – convincing to constituents and allies whose concurrence is necessary as a condition to giving the terms effect. While still in position to give or to withhold consent, each party is constrained to seek terms consistent with other purposes reflecting its relevant order of values.

This gets close to the heart of the inspection issue. Each side – with reason – attributes to the other ultimate desires and preferences incompatible with its own. Each side – again with cause – suspects that the other, given opportunity, would bring its more remote desires and preferences into its pattern of immediate actions. This reciprocal anxiety is nothing to puzzle about. Authentic spokesmen for the USSR articulate international goals entirely incompatible with the US order of values. Spokesmen on our side articulate world goals which could be realized only after a frustration of the USSR amounting to historic defeat. That the articulated goals of both parties may lie beyond reach is beside the point. Each side makes plain enough what preferences it would establish as purposes of policy if it could.

In analyzing the interplay between inspection and the basic conflict of purposes, it is important to recognize that individuals may accept, draw upon and apply orders of values prevalent within their culture even while ignoring or renouncing beliefs underlying them. One may act on monotheistic postulates while professing agnosticism. In this respect, hopes for a detente between the US and the USSR founded on Khrushchev's indifference or even cynicism – often alleged but never demonstrated – regarding Marxist-Leninist tenets are probably like fantasies that a Borgia pope, because inconstant on finer points of practice, might have been flexible on matters in controversy with Luther.

Natural Law and Inspected Truth

The mode of thought underlying the US approach, whether or not recognized and acknowledged, rests on ideas of natural law. A unified Creation, with a pattern of right reason inherent, is postulated. Good is identified with it. Principles are held as reflections of this good. What opposes good is ascribed to aberrant free will. Interests are seen as colored with such aberrant imperfections associated with misguided free will. Principles thus transcend interests. Social good inheres in upholding principles impartially. The concept of authority – which is to say, power to bind in conscience – is based on devotion to principles unswayed by interests, impartially applied. Facts are items of information developed impartially by authority and are an objective basis on which to apply principles. Such are the justifying, if not always reigning, concepts in state life.

In the US view, an inspectorate in connection with arms control comprises institutional arrangements for projecting onto the world scene, and especially onto the USSR, a fact-finding function based on the conception of authority described above. It must be above interests, impartial in endeavor – its authority acknowledged, permitted scope, facilitated in operations, submitted to without cavil or hindrance. Its existence and functions, thus serving as both a substantive and symbolic substitute for trust between the great adversaries, would gradually evolve a basis for confidence. It would serve to assemble and to verify facts to bolster assurance or to confirm doubt. In extremity – that is, in event of the need to abrogate an agreement in face of unacceptable violations by others – the system would provide warrant and vindication. In sum, the US plan for a disarming or disarmed world is congenial to the US view of legitimacy.

The USSR view is different. The USSR asserts a total claim on the future, based on its dialectic concepts of history. An essential aspect of this claim is that history progresses by inherent momentum toward a final perfection perceivable only through Communist doctrine. Concepts of legitimacy are derived from

---

CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL *is a member of the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research. From 1950 to 1953 he was a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department. He has since been a consultant to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of* The Limits of Foreign Policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the law of history which ordains eventual universal triumph for Communist interests and purposes. All other interests and purposes are deemed deviant and devoid of legitimacy. The ruling Communist Party is considered sole interpreter and custodian of legitimacy. Bearers of Party authority are constrained not to concede legitimacy to any authority beyond their control.

Intrusion and Inspection

No thread, I contend, has been more consistent in Communist conduct than this sensitivity to making any concessions to external authority – manifested in the World War II period by the Soviet's obduracy against the scheduling by the Western allies of chain bombing out of Russian airfields, stiffness over timing of lend-lease convoys, and impingements on UNRRA operations. The instances often cited as countervailing turn out to be unconvincing under examination. Russia's acceptance of inspection in post World War II occupation agreements, for example, pertained to domains not yet brought to heel. Soviet agreement to inspection in Antartica involved no Communist area. Communist accession to inspection in North Korea under armistice terms has proved nugatory in real effect. According to a notion persistent within the so-called disarmament community, the USSR did once offer concessions on inspection in test-ban discussions. But should we construe a martini recipe as an offer of a drink?

An index to this attitude is the Soviet practice of linking inspection with the term *intrusion.* All too often, Americans echo the linkage, using "intrusive inspection" for inspection proper and "nonintrusive inspection" for monitoring. A standard definition of *intrusion* is "forcing of oneself into a place without right of welcome, the act wrongfully entering onto property of another." *Inspection* is defined in lexicons as "the act of examining officially" – and *officially* means "with authority, with sanction." "Intrusive inspection" is a contradiction in terms and "nonintrusive inspection" a tautology. Both expressions should be banned from US discourse.

Soviet willingness to invite in an authenticating agency on occasion is quite conceivable but has no bearing on submitting to inspection. The USSR persistently says inspection is out – a stand consistent with Communist dogma. In face of this, it is difficult to explain lingering US hopes that the USSR really does not mean it, and that obduracy can some day be overcome by adjusting details. The US may indeed exaggerate the efficacy of inspection. In this connection, the notion that inspection has a potential for guiding the USSR toward becoming an open society may be laid aside as inherently too marginal and speculative for serious consideration. The point of inquiry is whether inspection could do the job for which designed. I am not in a position to state definitive views. I can only raise questions.

One question pertains to inspection as a way of ensuring compliance with any agreement. For the moment, and for argument, formal acceptance of inspection terms by the USSR and other Communist regimes may be assumed. But formal acceptance does not necessarily mean cooperation. The Korean armistice pattern might well be repeated – continuous frustration, postponement, avoidance, and administered ambiguity. The level and quality of information afforded might well be less than attainable through monitoring – that is, verification by means available to the US irrespective of Soviet cooperation. The international inspectorate would probably provide small, if any, assurance of compliance.

A second question concerns the qualities of an international inspectorate. To gain necessary respect and credit even under favorable conditions, such an inspectorate would have to have high motivation and technical competence. Yet presumably an inspectorate would have to draw heavily on people from uncommitted countries. Most of these countries are – and will remain for a long time – short on technicians. They will need to keep their best men at home.

Third, a question is in order concerning the integrity of findings by an international inspectorate. US expectations are based on the assumptions that everyone can divorce "truth" from its consequences. The US envisages an international inspectorate disciplined and constrained to rigorous, exacting attitudes toward empirical data, irrespective of preconceptions and preferences. Yet the US doubts the detachment of Communists in an inspectorate; in the event neutrals may prove equally self-interested.

US expectations overlook a disposition, basic in the cultures of many of the neutralist countries, to view magisterial functions as intended not so much to forward the triumph of good over evil as to keep contention between them from getting out of hand. This calls for temporizing, mitigating, hoping always to work out arrangements to save something all around, but in a pinch favoring concessions to the more intransigent. F. S. C. Northrop's *Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics* reflects good insights into this attitude.

I recall an illustrative instance. Representing the Government of the United States at an International Red Cross Conference during 1952 I was forced to the limit of my patience in trying both to avoid a donnybrook and to preserve national prestige in the face of outrageous attacks from Chinese Com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munist delegates. At intermission, a delegate from a leading neutralist country, after praising me for reasonable forbearance, added, "These men are mad dogs. You should have let them have their way" – a *non sequitur* to me but obviously plausible to him.

To expect unequivocal findings by an international inspectorate which has neutrals in the swing position – especially with respect to crucial considerations likely to precipitate renewed competition on armament – is probably too much. Should the US ever find itself constrained to abrogate a disarmament treaty, it would probably have to do so, and to face consequences, on its own sole sovereign discretion – without any international certificate.

It could be – who can say for sure? – that inspection would not raise the level of technical surety over that achievable by monitoring. Some experts say this. Perhaps also the US has not realistically appraised factors of feasibility in regard to plans for an inspectorate. These negative considerations, however valid, do not dispose of the matter. It is necessary also to take account of the political acceptability of an agreement within the US – an aspect bearing on the juridic character of an agreement.

So systematic and far-reaching a venture as a formal agreement on arms control and disarmament should be an act of state of a most solemn character – to be undertaken only on a basis of firm and demonstrated concurrence between the Executive and the coordinate political branch. It should commit the nation beyond the term of the Administration launching it, with a status above party contention. It should contract other parties to obligations equally durable and deep. A treaty seems appropriate, even indispensable, as an instrument for any such formal agreement.

In this perspective, limits, difficulties, and doubts regarding inspection recede to academic import. Questions of confidence and dependability are not merely technical. They never were. They might conceivably have become so if at some juncture relationships between the US and the Communist imperium had turned onto a basically better course. Then armaments might conceivably have been tethered without all the paraphernalia of inspection. But this hypothesis is based on fantastic rather than realistic imagination. Whatever the theoretical possibilities under dreamt-up conditions, one now must take account of the autumn missile crisis. I have heard hopeful speculations regarding its effect, as if fellowship might grow out of a shared crisis, as if wrestling a bear to the brink were a mutually endearing experience. I am skeptical. I see little in recent events to nourish the mystique of trust. An uninspected arms control compact seems out for the calculable future. The outlook is dour – indefinite impasse on formal terms, with abatement of the problems restricted to unilateral steps and to informal and tacit agreements, with or without more such crises as the one over Cuba.

Foreign Aid: Sharing the Burden

by Christopher Willoughby

Whether under Truman, Eisenhower or Kennedy, foreign aid has always seemed a mutinous ship in search of a captain. Now, with the announced departure of Fowler Hamilton as head of the Agency for International Development (he is the ninth director of the program in 12 years), the search begins again. It is a truism that aid has no "constituents," and is unpopular in Congress. Rep. Otto Passman of Louisiana, the bogeyman of "give-away" programs, is even now traveling around the world to check up on how the taxpayers' money is being spent, and it can be assumed that he will pick up some ammunition en route for next year's appropriation battle. Critics notwithstanding, the remarkable thing is that foreign aid is an established and expanding institution; the budget for US economic aid to underdeveloped countries has risen from approximately $1.3 billion in 1952 to $3.6 billion in 1962.

In reading through this year's debates, however, a new, or if not new, sharply accented note can be detected: "The United States is carrying a disproportionate share of the burden." That note is echoed by opponents and supporters alike. Opponents are certain that those selfish European countries whose present prosperity was built on Marshall Aid could now relieve the United States of more of the load. Supporters, convinced of the poorer nations' growing need for aid, are

CHRISTOPHER WILLOUGHBY *is assistant to James Reston in the Washington bureau of* The New York Times.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

anxious to boost the flow from all prosperous sources. "The allies should assume a fair share of the burden" is a useful political slogan for both groups; but it has spread the assumption that the US is much more generous than any of its allies and has nothing to learn from them. Let us see how true this is.

At the end of 1959, Douglas Dillon, then Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, fearful that large American balance of payments deficits might bring deeper and deeper cuts in aid appropriations, and anxious for more cooperation with European countries, conceived the idea of a forum in which the major Western donors of foreign aid might get together and exchange views and achieve an equitable distribution of the load. On January 14, 1960, a Special Economic Committee of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, originally set up to administer Marshall Aid funds, resolved to establish the Development Assistance Group composed of eight countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States – and the Common Market High Commission. Two other countries joined in 1960 – Japan in the spring and Holland in the summer. The first job, as the Germans urged, was to find out how much each was already giving.

When the comparative statistics first became available – in spring 1961 – George Ball, Dillon's successor as Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, urged that each country should try to set aside 1 percent of its national income for aid to underdeveloped countries – a formula originally proposed by the United Nations. Ball suggested that it might be adjusted upwards for countries with a higher than average standard of living and downwards for countries making a larger than average defense effort. No decisions were reached about how much each country should contribute, but the very existence of the comparative statistics was an incentive to competition between aid-givers.

These comparisons – evidently embarrassing for laggards – have in fact become an important part of the work of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the successor-body to the Development Assistance Group. This January the Committee met in Paris and decided to conduct Annual Aid Reviews, the first of which took place last May and June. The US program was assessed by three examiners – France, Japan and the Common Market High Commission. We in turn joined in examining the programs of Belgium, Germany, Italy and the UK. The evidence produced was in general encouraging to State Department officials who had been trying to stimulate Europe. Total official foreign economic aid from member countries had gone up 22 percent from $4.9 billion in 1960 to $6 billion in 1961; Germany and Japan had increased their contributions most markedly (79 percent and 45 percent respectively); but Italy, Canada and Portugal had fallen back a little. The chief laggard for 1961 proved to be Canada, a country which had been outstandingly generous in earlier postwar years.

What do the figures show today? Most comparisons are based merely on per capita contributions, and by this standard the US ranks second, behind France. But a more realistic comparison is based on ability to pay. By this standard the US ranks fifth, devoting a smaller share of her national income to overseas development than France, Portugal, Belgium or Germany. The US ranks ahead of Britain, the Netherlands and Italy in government aid. But Britain and the Netherlands outrank the US (and all other countries) in *private* development investment. Italy spends little abroad, but has a vast development program in its own South.

The Story Statistics Don't Tell

These comparisons can, of course, be misleading, for they do not measure the impact of each nation's program on its domestic well-being. The average American does not really earn $2,823 and then have $19 taken away by the government and given to foreigners. An indeterminate part of his $2,823 derives directly from the fact that he is giving away his $19. Much of the $19 has to be spent in the US, creating jobs, increasing profits, etc. Furthermore, about $5 of the $19 is spent on surplus agricultural commodities. These surpluses would exist even if there were no foreign aid.

The burden of a foreign aid program also depends on the way assistance is given; and here some European countries have much to learn from the United States. Assistance may be given or lent, it may be lent for a long time or for a short time, it may be tied to sale of domestic goods or it may leave the recipient free to choose where to buy, it may be loaned at high interest rates or low. For example, a grant or long-term low-interest loan of dollars is more burdensome to the United States than a commercial loan of the same amount at 5 percent interest and repayable in 10 years. Obviously it is less of a burden to the lender if he earns 5 percent instead of 3 percent interest and if he gets his money back in ten years instead of forty. Most would hold too that a grant or long-term low-interest loan is more valuable to the poorer country than a commercial loan. But the Germans have tended to argue that commercial-rate loans are really more useful to an underdeveloped country because the requirement that interest be paid and principal returned at a relatively early date ensures that the money is not wasted on low-priority, low-return projects. On analogous grounds the Germans prefer to finance particular projects rather than general development plans, for projects provide an opportunity for German firms to supervise and train the local man-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agers with whom they cooperate. So Germany earns a relatively high rate of interest on its aid and, by financing projects rather than programs, it usually manages to give its own economy a boost by ensuring that the projects are undertaken by German firms. German foreign aid – over two-thirds of it in the form of hard loans – is thus a good deal less burdensome to the Germans than it would be were it effectively free to be spent anywhere and provided in the same way as American foreign aid – only one-sixth hard loans.

It has seemed to some that the Germans' insistence on stiff terms as a means of making sure their aid really benefits the recipient country is kindly paternalism, and that the predominance of grants and soft loans in American foreign aid is yet another example of AID's wanton extravagance. Yet vital as it is that foreign aid should stimulate local initiative and not line the pockets of local nabobs, stiff terms are not always the way to ensure this. Loans on easy terms may be essential for getting railways and roads and harbors built in a backward country that will only then provide opportunities for such profitable investments as textile mills, factories, and stores. Underdeveloped countries are also habitually short of foreign exchange and cannot wisely accept more loans involving a further increase in the amount of foreign exchange that they must set aside each year for interest-payments to Europe or North America. Insistence on giving aid only in the form of hard loans either distorts the pattern of investment from what would be best for the underdeveloped country or simply means that other donor-countries have to take over the financing of all the less attractive longer-run projects.

The United States has been quite successful in persuading other countries to improve the quality of their aid. Before 1960, for example, German loans did not exceed five years and were at commercial rates of interest. Now it is at least possible to obtain a German loan up to twenty years at 2.5-4.5 percent interest. The Germans, too, have relaxed their "projects only" principle by giving some large amounts of assistance to such development programs as India's Five Year Plan. But there is still a shortage of foreign aid with liberal terms. George Ball reemphasized this in a speech in September: "... more of the economically advanced countries must provide credit on longer terms and with reduced interest." Improvement in the financial quality of aid can be expected particularly from Britain and Germany, also from Italy and Japan. France's terms are already more generous than those of the United States.

In addition to its concern with the quality of aid given, the DAC could, in the longer run, serve as an instrument for organizing the provision of aid in such a way as to take up part of the slack in countries suffering from unemployment, though for now that may be too revolutionary.

Foreign Economic Aid and Defense Expenditures of the United States and Major European Allies, 1961

	Gross National Product per head (in $)	Economic Assistance given, per head (in $)	Economic Assistance as percentage of GNP	Defense Expenditure per head (in $)	Defense Expenditure as percentage of GNP
United States	2823	19	.67	247	8.7
Belgium	1440	12	.83	41	2.8
Germany	1438	10	.70	56	3.9
United Kindom...	1407	8	.59	97	6.7
France	1358	21	1.55	87	6.4
Netherlands	1054	6	.57	45	4.3
Italy	692	1.4	.20	25	3.6
Portugal	273	3.4	1.20	22	8.4

Economic assistance includes: grants, reparations, net loans repayable in recipients' currencies, net transfers of resources through sales for recipients' currencies (e.g. PL 480), grants and capital subscriptions to multilateral agencies (e.g World Bank), net consolidation credits, net loans over five years, purchase of International Bank bonds.

Defense expenditure includes militry aid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The US is trying to teach the Europeans another lesson about administering aid, and here too the Development Assistance Committee may prove useful. Partly because of its own colonial background and its long history as a neutralist, the United States appears to understand better than Europe the need for internationalism in the administration of foreign aid. While the US has taken on global responsibilities, most of the European countries have until very recently confined their efforts to particular areas such as their colonies and ex-colonies – and have sometimes resented the intrusion of an outsider like the US. As a 1957 Senate Report pointed out, that the prospective recipient of bilateral aid "confronts a dilemma: Are the benefits of aid greater than the limitations upon its freedom to administer the aid, and the loss of face in the implication that it is unable to manage its own affairs? It may discern real or fancied motives of self-interest in the giver and feel that it is being used to further those alien interests. This is resented, especially if the recipient is ambitious for recognition and prestige as a new nation." If the donor-countries were to combine in an international organization like the DAC, it might be easier for the donors to concern themselves with efficient economic development along mutually agreed lines, rather than with political compensation for themselves. To make the DAC a more international body, more countries should be encouraged to join. Norway became a member last summer; other smaller European countries may soon follow her example. To prevent DAC from looking like a white man's club it might be desirable to persuade underdeveloped countries to join as donors, however small. The association of underdeveloped countries as donors would do much to help them understand the economic and political problems of the other donors.

Aid, Tied and Untied

Another set of problems with "burden sharing" arises from the impact of aid on balance of payments problems. Despite widespread views to the contrary, the sudden large increase in the American balance of payments deficit in 1958 was not caused by foreign aid expenditures, which remained about the same as the previous year. But in order to reduce the contribution aid was making to the deficit, policy was changed in November, 1960, so that almost all American aid must be spent on goods produced in the US. This practice of "tying" aid to goods produced by the donor country has been widely applied by all major aid-giving countries, other than Germany.

Tying aid is obviously undesirable to the recipient country, for it may require that country to buy more expensive or less appropriate machines than it would if it were free to shop around for the best buy. If the US insists that its aid dollars be spent on higher-priced goods made in America, the recipient country will need more dollars than if it were free to give its business to the lowest bidder. Moreover, once one country ties its aid, others tend to follow suit. If foreign producers can no longer get contracts under American foreign aid programs, they in turn exert pressure on their own governments to tie their aid.

Countries tie their aid because they fear their own producers cannot successfully compete with foreigners. But they also do it because a nation which is outdoing others in the proportion of its national income given in *untied* aid – even if its producers are competitive – is bound to find that some of this aid will be spent on goods produced only in other industrialized countries. That too can produce a balance of payments problem – more dollars going out than coming in. How can this payments problem be dealt with in a manner that satisfies the economic interests of both givers and getters?

Two things, it seems to me, can be done. First, low tariff barriers between the industrial countries will insure that they are competitive with one another. The Common Market is an important step in this direction, and President Kennedy's trade bill will help to extend the process of tariff removal to the United States. Second, if all countries can be persuaded to agree to increase their untied aid, then there is no reason why anyone should suffer significant net deficit on account of foreign aid. Together the strong industrial nations can largely remove the balance of payments problem by reducing tariff barriers and by concerting their giving so that each donor gets a share of freely-placed contracts sufficient to offset foreign exchange expenditures.

Just as businesses are moving in both directions across the Atlantic in order to be in touch with the latest ideas from the other side, so too governments can learn from one another. The amount of aid which we – and the Europeans – can give is limited not by economic constraints but by the poverty of political imagination.

SECOND PRINTING

Reprints Available

Time for a Keynes

Report on the US Economy

35 cents a copy $3 – 10 copies
$12– 50 copies $20 – 100 copies

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 19th Street, N.W. Washington, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Story of Modern Mongolia

by Jack Raymond

One of the glories of journalism is that its practitioners "meet such interesting people" and "travel to such interesting places," but one of the great profession's drawbacks is that it often compels newsmen, with insufficient preparation, to cover a story that suddenly becomes possible. Late in 1956, for example, journalistic opportunity dropped me in Ulan Bator, capital of the Mongolian Peoples Republic, better known as Outer Mongolia.

Nomads and Commissars
Mongolia Revisited
by Owen Lattimore
(Oxford; $5.75)

And all I had for background were dim recollections of Harold Lamb's fictionalized biography of Genghis Khan.

What would I not have given for Mr. Lattimore's latest book! His learned and well-written treatise on the little known "nomads and commissars" even now brings into clearer perspective some of the things I saw and heard six years ago. The subtitle of his book, *Mongolia Revisited*, refers ostensibly to his tour of the country in 1961. It reflects more than thirty years of Mongol studies.

Mr. Lattimore was one of the "old China hands" who got caught up in the whirlwind of the McCarthy era. He comments briefly and dryly on that episode. (Charges against him were dropped.) A Mongol friend, he relates, had been imprisoned in a period of Stalinist-style false accusations, liquidations and terror in the 1930s. Now free, he told the visiting professor that in addition to the usual perjurers and informers there were those who would accuse others "as a way of trying to make themselves look loyal."

"I'll tell you what; I'm not afraid of anybody, capitalist or Communist, if he's an honest man and not afraid. What I'm afraid of is people who are afraid," the Mongol exclaimed.

"I told him," Mr. Lattimore writes, "that, having been through the McCarthy period in my own country, I thought I knew what he meant."

The reader of Mr. Lattimore's book will learn a great deal about this little-known attractive people whose representatives now sit in the United Nations. "Outer" and "Inner" Mongolia are administrative terms, he reminds us. The Manchus, in the late 16th Century, conquered Inner Mongolia first; Outer Mongolia, much later. Inner Mongolia was linked closely to the administrative system set up for China. Outer Mongolia, autonomous from the fall of the Manchu Empire in 1911, became completely independent of China on the basis of a 1921 plebiscite.

Politically, culturally, the Soviet Union exerts a persuasive influence on the new Mongolia. Does Moscow control and rule? A great deal depends upon one's definition of a satellite. But it should be kept in mind that the Mongol revolutionary leaders sought out the Soviet Union, after the fall of the Manchu Empire in 1911.

Mr. Lattimore writes: "For the Mongols, the real problem often was not whether a thing should be done in the bourgeois way or the socialist way but whether it could be done by Mongols at all. The mastering of new techniques and genres – leaping instead of evolving into the 20th Century intellectual world – had for the Mongols the excitement of creative effort, even when it was imitative."

He also points out: "In Mongolia, there was no history of a working class struggle against capitalism, no inherited tradition of loyalty to trade unions to be overcome, no social democracy to be superseded, no two-party or multi-party system to be supplanted, no urban-agrarian balance to be reconstructed. It was not a question of persuading or forcing people to do in a new way things they had already been doing in some other way, but of creating entirely new activities."

For centuries, while history books echoed with the marauding conquests of the Khans and their Mongol hordes, the homeland slumbered under the ambitionless ministrations of the Lama-Buddhist church. Not until the post-World War I revolution, a revolution Mr. Lattimore describes as the least-known of all, did the story of modern Mongolia begin.

Outer Mongolia, sandwiched between the Soviet Union and China, has more than 600,000 square miles. It has less than one million people, but more than 23 million animals – sheep, goats, horses, cows, yaks and camels. It has great mountains, great rivers, important lakes, rounded highland territories in the North and low-lying, arid Gobi or desert regions in the south. Mr. Lattimore compares it with a block of territory geographically resembling North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Montana, Wyoming and Colorado.

The results of four decades of Marxist rule are not sensational, but they are noteworthy. In 1961, for the first time in its history, Outer Mongolia raised

A visit with PABLO CASALS

This superbly illustrated book takes you into the home of the great musician – rehearsing, walking on the beach, talking about his life, his work, his dreams.

CELLIST IN EXILE

By BERNARD TAPER • $4.95
With 35 photographs. McGRAW-HILL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a grain surplus for export. Ulan Bator boasts several factories and the old coal mine at Nalakha, south of the city, has been mechanized. In 1921 Mongolia had one elementary school. A Mongol can now earn a six year medical degree without leaving his country.

What the world most needs to know about Outer Mongolia, however, Mr. Lattimore points out, is that "it is an outstanding example of the successful economic development of one country by a planned program of aid from another country." The Mongols, he writes, are "better fed and better clothed than any other people in Asia."

"This is of world importance," Mr. Lattimore continues. "No form of international competition is more important than rivalry in programs of economic aid." This observation may have some bearing on the United States' experience with economic aid in certain Asian countries.

Profound as is Mr. Lattimore's respect for the ties between Mongolia and Russia he has not yielded in his respect for China. It is possible, according to him, that China will catch up with the Soviet Union before the Russians catch up with the West. The Chinese learn fast. Moreover, he adds, Russians and Mongols know: ". . . that in spite of present difficulties and setbacks, nothing can now stop the Chinese from becoming one of the greatest nations in the world – a leading nation in thought, invention, discovery, as well as power."

Mr. Lattimore assures us that "for the time being" Moscow and Peking will not engage in rivalry over Mongolia. They have other things to worry each other about. The Mongols don't want to choose between them. They want to live in peace with their two neighbors as well as with all countries. But emphatic in Lattimore's discussion is the forecast of a Chinese entrance in world affairs that must not be ignored.

He quotes a Russian expert on China: "In the Chinese book, you Americans are their worst enemies and we Russians are their best friends. Now they see their best friends trying to work out some way of peaceful coexistence and competition with their worst enemies – and they don't like it."

As for the United States and Outer Mongolia, Mr. Lattimore says, and I agree, Washington should establish relations with Ulan Bator, for the purposes of mutual education. He writes: "It is important for us that the Mongols should have a chance to know what we are like, as it is for us to learn something about Mongolia. It is necessary for us to understand the relations of Mongolia with the Soviet Union and China if we want to know the kind of world we are living in. . . ."

"BY ASKING A *UN resolution on apartheid, the U.S. has granted that the internal racial problems of a nation are a proper subject for UN debate and action. Such an interpretation was fortified by the American delegate's reference to efforts being made by his own government to end segregation in his country. Does Mr. Plimpton want the next police action in the South to be launched by a UN motion and under a UN flag?*''

For the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW send 25¢ to Dept. R-1 150 E. 35 St., New York 16, N.Y.

The Student and the Harlot

by Richard Todd

Robert Gover's first novel, *The One Hundred Dollar Misunderstanding*, comes with thumps on the back from two figures who – whatever else you will deny them – cannot be denied their names. Old Henry Miller and young Gore Vidal exclaim on the back of its first-printing dust jacket. "I hope this book will be read by every adolescent in the country," says Mr. Vidal, who adds coyly, "which is most of the population." Mr. Miller is even more taken: "What a find! . . . This book should create a sensation."

The One Hundred Dollar Misunderstanding
by Robert Gover
(Grove; $3.95)

The One Hundred Dollar Misunderstanding is all about sex. It is the tale of a college boy's weekend encounter with a Negro prostitute. It is told in two first persons: the story proceeds in alternating chapters, the one in the voice of the sophomore, the next in the voice of the harlot. So we hear both.

That there are sides is apparent from the start. In a briefly offensive "Author's Note" we're cautioned not to "transmute [the characters] from typo-alphabetic symbols," told that "the following is a made-up untrue story." The flashy note of belligerence in that voice seems to make the announcement: here is a book with an argument.

On the one hand there is the simple-minded fellow (J. C. Holland, as he names himself) who is given to speaking in all the worst rhetoric of the age. He defends every piety Mr. Gover can remember, mouths every cliché, stands foursquare against the "moral cancer" of prostitution, but is "no prude," finds his way to the whorehouse under the ruse of "anthropological" curiosity, and lingers for other reasons. And on the other hand, there is the voice of Kitten, the 14-year-old whore, who tells her tale with vigor, earthiness and phonetic filth. (There isn't a four-letter word in the book: they are either contracted to a gutteral three, or extended to a rich five letters.) Kitten, of course, is hypocrisy's foe, an unabashedly practical thing, who nevertheless is pleased to get her "naecher up."

The meeting of these two does at least manage to do in young Holland's triple standard. (There is, in his amorous life at 19, Kitten the harlot, two hometown loose-girls, and Barbara, his steady girl whom he "wouldn't touch.") And because each voice is an elaborate exaggeration of itself, the technique is liable to provide some broad humor. You probably will not feel guilty about smiling as the hero exclaims: "Christmas! You'd think an intelligent red-blooded, white, church-going non-communist like I, with my genius for great salesmanship, would avoid ending up in the nude." And Kitten can do better than that, as when she confronts her client who sits nude before the television watching a "foreign affairs" program, and looses a tirade against the machine, that "glassface bastid."

But Mr. Gover did not want to settle for a moral bedroom farce. Kitten is offered as a fresh viewer of life, and a commentator. That Mr. Gover is trying to extend her role in this way becomes

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clear during the television incident, and in fact "tee vee" becomes a handy symbol for all of society's misadventures. She rejects the whole world the glassface speaks for, and in a bizarre scene, she tries to throw the set itself out the window. Whites, in the terms of this bit of metaphor, become "tee vee fays" and things (at what is plainly marked a touching moment) become "tee vee terrible" as she is left alone in a car on a busy highway, with cars going by "just like on them tee vee shows I seen when I was a wee tiny Pickaninny. . . ." But the familiar sound of tough-talk sentimentalism which creeps in here (and emerges in earnest by the book's end) is a symptom of the fact that Mr. Gover is groping for a big statement he cannot reach. It is a more complicated statement, presumably, than ever can be reached by a dialect's lilting vulgarities, ranting at the "tee vee," and appeals to the "naecher" in us, because the reader must hear the stuff being cannily transformed into brothel-spun wisdom, and must resent it. If we have sympathies, they go where they are sent, to Kitten, but not to Kitten as earthy prophet or sage.

E. B. White Forever

by Webster Schott

My employer, who spends a large sum of money on national advertising, recently received a copy of E. B. White's new book from the management of *The New Yorker*. Apparently it was sent to acquaint him more fully with what happens between the Brooks Brothers ads and the pictures of Miss Rheingold and in the hope of influencing him to put something of his own there. He in turn sent the book to me with no thought of influence at all. He already has plenty.

The Points of My Compass
by E. B. White
(Harper & Row; $4)

It's a moderately cheerful book and comes at exactly the right time. Lord knows we need encouragement out here in Kansas City. The Dutch elms are dying like flies at the end of summer; the squirrels have taken to living in spouting along the edges of apartment houses; the owner of our ball club has been demanding a new stadium or else. We have reason to worry about the world.

So does Mr. White, and his letters from points east and west and north and south (of *The New Yorker* office) show it. The trains are running slow or not at all in Maine. The architecture in New York is making it tough on nesting Rock Doves. The coons have been evicting one another from a tree on Mr. White's farm; one of his favorites mysteriously disappeared. The old De Soto with all that leg and head room had to be replaced by a presumptuous Lark. The United Nations charter still hasn't been amended to include a clause saying, "A member shall make no move abridging the right of the Secretary General to stop by for a drink at any hour of the day of night." People are reading *Walden* the wrong way. It's the "most humorous of the New England books," but to admire it has become "something of an embarrassment, for the mass of men have an indistinct notion that its author was a sort of Nature Boy."

Mr. White has such a subtly-developed literary technique it's almost impossible to know when the words are running the writing, when Mr. White's head is in command, or when the central nervous system has taken over to pick up subliminal signals. That's style for you: marriage of idea, language, sensibility. Never a man to let a metaphor run out of gunpowder, Mr. White lays down a barrage that would satisfy Douglas MacArthur:

"Many of his [Thoreau's] shots rico-

Hyung Sook longs to go to school. But schooling is not free in Korea and the boy's widowed mother cannot afford the school fees. She works as a seamstress and earns about $4.00 a week. Every penny goes for rice and rent for their one small room.

Hyung Sook has heard of the generosity of Americans. He dreams that Save the Children Federation will find someone in America to sponsor him. Then he will have money for school, for books, for decent clothing, for more nourishing food.

can you say no?

Please say yes to a child like Hyung Sook! Through the Federation, you or your group can bring hope and help to a child. You will receive the photograph and story of the child you help and immediately begin a warm person-to-person relationship through an exchange of letters.

Your sponsorship may also enable the child's family and community to initiate self-help plans and provide small grants or loans to help put them into effect. Please fill in the coupon below so that a needy child in Korea, Greece, Lebanon, France, Italy, Finland, West Germany or Austria can look at the world with hope again.

Save the Children Federation is registered with the U. S. State Department Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid and is a member of the International Union for Child Welfare.

Serving Children for 31 Years
SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION
Norwalk, Connecticut

I wish to contribute $150.00 annually to sponsor a ☐ girl ☐ boy in _____ or where the need is greatest ☐. *(countries listed above)*
Enclosed is my first payment: $12.50 a month ☐
$37.50 a quarter ☐ $75 semi-annually ☐ $150 annually ☐
I cannot sponsor a child; enclosed is contribution of $_____.

Name _____
Address _____
City _____ Zone _____ State _____
Contributions are income tax deductible. 11-24-2

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AN ACCOMMODATION

THE NEW REPUBLIC

Briefly:

you may purchase any book recently reviewed in *The New Republic* for 20 percent less than its retail price. Some of these books are listed in the coupon (below) with the bookstore prices and the lower rates to which you are entitled as a reader of *The New Republic.*

Your check must accompany the order. (We cannot bill you, because the bookkeeping and clerical costs would be prohibitive.)

You may order direct from us, as shown below. *Mail to*

THE NEW REPUBLIC
shipping department
1244 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Please send me a copy of each book I have checked off below.

☐ Powers: *Morte D'Urban* – (retail price – $4.50) PRICE: $3.60
☐ Heckscher: *The Public Happiness* – (retail price – $4.95) PRICE $3.96
☐ Knebel & Bailey: *7 Days in May* – (retail price – $4.95) PRICE: $3.96
☐ Lowry: *Ultramarine* – (retail price – $4.95) PRICE: $3.96
☐ Purdy: *Children Is All* – (retail price – $4.25) PRICE: $3.40
☐ Burdick and Wheeler: *Fail-Safe* – (retail price – $4.95) PRICE: $3.96

TOTAL:_____*

* My check for this amount is enclosed.

Name_____
(please print)

Street_____

City_____ Zone___ State_____

chet and nick him on the rebound, and throughout the melee there is a horrendous cloud of inconsistencies and contradictions, and when the shooting dies down and the air clears, one is impressed chiefly by the courage of the rider and how splendid it was that somebody should have ridden in there and raised all that ruckus."

Concern for politics is a mark of the civilized man, the Greeks told us, and an insightful observer of contemporary US politics like E. B. White cuts through abstractions to make basic psychological inferences:

> "Democrats do a lot of bellyaching about the press being preponderantly Republican, which it is. But they don't do the one thing that could correct the situation: they don't go into the publishing business. Democrats say they haven't got that kind of money, but I'm afraid they haven't got that kind of temperament or, perhaps, nerve."

The relationship between what people do and what people say has a perplexing history, and the problem still gives us pause, but Mr. White hasn't been taken in:

> "The Supreme Court said nothing about silliness, but I suspect it may play more of a role than one might suppose. People are, if anything, more touchy about being thought silly than they are about being thought unjust."

And he hasn't fallen for any sappy ideas about progress. He insists on simple wisdom:

> "Perhaps success in the future will depend partly on our ability to generate cheap power, but I think it will depend to a greater extent on our ability to resist a technological formula that is sterile: peas without pageantry, corn without coon, knowledge without wisdom, kitchens without a warm stove."

All in all, the state of the world has shaken Mr. White right down to the feet: "Once in a while I try a little march of my own, stepping out briskly toward a reputable hill, but when I do I feel that I am alone, and that I am on a treadmill. The way things are now, we could all march for the rest of our days and still not advance perceptibly." Mr. White knows what's wrong. Everybody is overreacting, imagining complexities. The "vast riddle" we're in would submit to a solution if only the UN would try "arguing the case for mud turtles and other denizens of ponds and ditches." Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy have to realize that "the whole meaning and worth of gardens has been brought into question" by nuclear testing.

Mr. White certainly gets things down to manageable size, and the advantages are tremendous. A man's common sense and urbanity can operate when he isn't scared out of his wits. He is able to handle the 20th Century with a nostalgia that shows his good breeding and imperturbability. Furthermore, it's safe. One doesn't give offense by saying that race hatred, the conspiracy in Detroit, and atomic warfare are just plain silly.

With this kind of attitude there's no telling what poetry we may write or how deeply we can feel. "As a writing man, or secretary, I have always felt charged with the safekeeping of all unexpected items of worldly or unworldly enchantment," says Mr. White, "as though I might be held personally responsible if even a small one were to be lost." Keeping track of all the enchantment gives us awareness of participating in the universe. We know we're alive all right.

I write this looking out toward our garage. The doors need paint again, which I'll take care of Sunday. That might be a good time to think about what we should do with Cuba. Developments down there have brought the whole meaning and worth of cigar smoking into question.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Jack Raymond *is a Washington correspondent for* The New York Times. Richard Todd *is a young writer just out of school.* Webster Schott *is literary editor of* Focus/Midwest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JULES FEIFFER


IT'S TIME, AMERICA, FOR "WHAT DO YOU WANT TO BE WHEN YOU GROW UP?" THE FUN SHOW THAT ANSWERS THAT BOTHERSOME QUESTION-"WHERE DID I GO WRONG?" WHO'S OUR FIRST GUEST, FRANK?
HI, STEPPING BEFORE OUR NATION WIDE SELF HELP CAMERAS IS MRS. E.S.P. OF PATCHOGUE, L.I.
AND WHAT IS IT YOU WANTED TO BE WHEN YOU GREW UP, MRS. E.S.P.?
I COULD NEVER MAKE UP MY MIND. I USED TO WANT TO BE AN OPERA SINGER.
AN OPERA SINGER OF SONGS! HOW DOES THAT RATE ON THE AMBITION METER, AUDIENCE?
RAH
BUT I COULDN'T SEEM TO GET STARTED. THEN I WANTED TO BE A NOVELIST


A NOVELIST OF BOOKS! HOW DOES THAT SCORE, AUDIENCE?
RAH
BUT I COULDN'T SEEM TO GET STARTED. IN THE MEANTIME I HAD GROWN UP TO BE THE ONE THING I NEVER WANTED TO BE- A MOTHER.
A MOTHER OF CHILDREN! SCORE THAT ONE, AUDIENCE!
RAH RAH RAH RAH RAH
BUT THAT'S WHERE I WENT WRONG! IT'S HARD WORK. IT'S TOO MUCH RESPONSIBILITY!
HA! HA! WE'RE ALL SURE YOU'RE A WON-DER-FUL PARENT, MRS. E.S.P.
IT GIVES ME NO TIME FOR MYSELF. I DON'T KNOW WHO I AM ANYMORE!
11-18
©1962 JULES FEIFFER


WON-DER-FUL! BUT IN YOUR HEART OF HEARTS ISN'T A MOTHER WHAT ALL YOU DEAR LADIES WANT TO BE? 'FESS UP, MRS. E.S.P. NOW 'FESS UP!
BUT NOW I KNOW WHAT I WANT TO BE! A TAP DANCER IN THE MOVIES WITH FRED ASTAIRE! NOT DANCING IN THE MOVIES WITH FRED ASTAIRE IS WHERE I WENT WRONG. YOU SAID YOU'D HELP ME. YOU SAID-
The Hall Syndicate, Inc.
HA! HA! AMERICA KNOWS YOU'RE PULLING ITS LEG, MRS. E.S.P. AND AS A BONUS FOR COMING ON OUR SHOW WE'RE GIVING YOU ANOTHER CHILD! ISN'T THAT WON-DER-FUL, AUDIENCE?
RAHHHHHHHHH
THIS WAY, LADY.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MOVIES

The Rise of Jane Fonda

Whatever the state of acting is in the English-speaking world, the state of its appreciation is low. A century ago audiences had a primary interest in acting, not in plays; in our times the primary interest has swung from actor to dramatist. In art, as elsewhere, everything has a price. If audiences' taste in plays will no longer endure trumpery virtuoso showpieces like *The Bride of Lammermoor* and *The Fool's Revenge*, they no longer get the brilliancies of Irving's and Booth's performances in them – actors whose careers were at least partially the result of contemporary interest in acting. (Audiences are still interested in singers' performances, and some 19th Century brummagem still flourishes in operatic contexts that give singers good opportunities. The two plays above are the bases of *Lucia* and *Rigoletto*.)

The Chapman Report
(Warner)
Period of Adjustment
(M-G-M)
Requiem for a Heavyweight
(Columbia)

In the brief history of the film, the predominant emphases in production have been on the mythic qualities of stardom, *per se*, and on direction. Because of the delights of the former, irrelevant to art, and the accomplishments of the latter, film audiences – even less than theater audiences – are little concerned with the nature and quality of acting. Besides, those who might have developed taste in the matter have been deterred by certain beliefs: that film acting is only a diluted form of stage acting; or that it is always mere "behaving" (which it often merely is); or that stars are only personalities whose "performances" are supplied by technicians (which, again, is often true); or that genuine acting is impossible without a live audience. Professionals also add that no line of established roles is open to the film actor (except in Japan, where classics are continually re-made), and there is no chance in films to refine a performance through repetition and study.

Almost all these points are arguable (although not here and now), but the result is inarguable: people with taste in other fields have little taste or even interest in the subject of film acting. This is not to imply that they have much taste or interest in stage acting, but it is certainly less in films.

It is thus possible for actors to perform for years in films, to be famous, without having their artistic qualities properly valued. To name one such example, Jean Simmons. Now a new talent is rising – Jane Fonda. Her light is hardly under a bushel, but as far as adequate appreciation is concerned, she might as well be another Sandra Dee. I have now seen Miss Fonda in three films. In all of them she gives performances that are not only fundamentally different from one another but are conceived without acting cliché and are executed with skill. Through them all can be heard, figuratively, the hum of that magnetism without which acting intelligence and technique are admirable but uncompelling.

In *Walk on the Wild Side*, a film beneath comment, Miss Fonda played a girl of the road, vicious, foxy, tough. Now she has two new films. In *The Chapman Report*, which (to put it in a phrase) is not up to the level of the novel, she plays a frigid young middle-class widow. The girl's pathological fear of sex, exacerbated by her hunger for love, is expressed in neurotic outbursts that cut to the emotional quick, with a truth too good for the material. In Tennessee Williams' comedy, *Period of Adjustment*, which is amusing enough, Miss Fonda plays a nervous Southern bride, anxious in more than one sense. Her comic touch is as sure as her serious one. Besides the gift of timing, she has what lies below all comedy: confidence in one's perception of the humorous – where it begins and, especially, where it ends. Her performance is full of delights, like the moment when the desolate bride telephones her father long-distance and her tears flood out as she manages to gasp: "Precious Daddy!"

It would be unfair to Miss Fonda and the reader to skimp her sex appeal. She has plenty. Not conventionally pretty, she has the kind of blunt startling features and generous mouth that can be charged with passion or the cartoon of passion as she chooses. Her slim, tall figure has thoroughbred gawky grace. Her voice is attractive and versatile; her ear for inflections is secure.

What lies ahead of this appealing and gifted young actress in our theater and film world? Does she stand a chance of fulfillment, or is she condemned – more by our environment than by managers – to mere success? (By the time this appears she will have opened on Broadway in a play that promises little.) With good parts in good plays and films, she could develop into a first-rate artist. Meanwhile it would be a pity if her gifts were not fully appreciated in these lesser, though large, roles

PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON NUCLEAR WAR:
"Even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouths."

What will nuclear war do to your city? Can you get your family into a shelter? Could you get out? Here are the disturbing answers by the world's leading scientists and specialists—Arthur Waskow, Erich Fromm, Herman Kahn, Norman Cousins, Roger Hagan, Lewis Mumford, others.

NO PLACE TO HIDE

FALLOUT SHELTERS — FACT AND FICTION
Edited by Seymour Melman
A BLACK CAT BOOK 75¢
Ask for it at your bookstore and newsstand
Grove Press, 64 University Pl., N.Y. 3, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Paul Newman's vivid performance of a battered pug in the recent Hemingway film is followed by Anthony Quinn's equally vivid performance as another of the breed in *Requiem for a Heavyweight*. The script by Rod Serling, from his TV play, combines sportswriter's sentimentality with "common-man" portentousness (the heroic concealed in what you and I are silly enough to think is small-scale or vapid). The plot is incredible: a top-rank boxer is desperate for a job a week after he quits boxing, and a mousy State Employment Agency woman changes character and chases him after one meeting. When Serling's dialogue is not trying for dumb-brute poetry, it slips into scriptwriter's hand-me-downs. ("I love that guy like a brother." "Now you listen and listen good.") Julie Harris is wasted as the woman and Mickey Rooney is miscast in a sympathetic part, but Jackie Gleason does more and better acting than in any of his films thus far. He makes the manager's flabbiness moral as well as physical. STANLEY KAUFFMANN

ARCHITECTURE

The President's Front Yard

Lafayette Square is the front yard of the White House. The little park with its squirrels, pigeons and statuary is one of the most pleasant spots in the center of the nation's capital and one of the very few where weary statesmen, office workers and tourists alike can find a bench to sit down. The gorgeous trees, however, scarcely hide the curiously dingy appearance of the square itself, a dismal jumble of neglected Federal houses, Victorian mansions, pseudo-Roman temples and nondescript, inconsiderate modern buildings. It's a disgraceful mixup of two plans – L'Enfant's of a quiet forecourt to the President's House and Cass Gilbert's of a Beaux Arts Roman square – both bogged down in the indifference to any urban design which characterizes most of America's cityscape.

Ever since they moved there, the Kennedys, together with their friend the Washington painter, William Walton, have worked openly and hard to avert the final ruin of Lafayette Square by a hideous scheme which had already been approved by the Fine Arts Commission and everyone else concerned. It would have torn down the remaining historic houses and replaced them with clumsy and massive new government offices. When, in the course of these efforts, an aide expressed his hesitation to once again bring some Lafayette Square matter to the President's attention, Mr. Kennedy is said to have remarked: "Don't apologize. After all, it may be the only monument we'll be able to leave."

It seemed a lost cause for awhile, but the high-level interest has now borne fruit. The clumsy architects were dismissed and, at Mr. Walton's instigation, the San Francisco architect, John Carl Warnecke, has come up with a new plan. It is an ingenious solution. It saves the remaining historic houses and restores the intimate scale L'Enfant had in mind. Warnecke accomplishes this by rebuilding the residential rows on the east and west sides of the square and placing the tall government office buildings behind them.

The Kennedys were obviously pleased. The President hailed the preservation of the lovely historic buildings as a nationally significant departure from the usual cataclysmic approach to urban renewal. And, when the new design was revealed October 17, Mrs. Kennedy unquestionably speeded its all-around approval by serving as the attractive female model press photographers insist on posing with architectural ones.

It is easy to share the Kennedy's apparent enthusiasm for the basic concept of the new plan. Its architectural design, however, raises some serious questions. Mr. Warnecke's intention to restore the residential row on Jackson Place with exact replicas of early 19th Century residences is apt to produce a monument to President James Monroe rather than John F. Kennedy.

This archeological exercise appears as an unnecessary abdication of modern architecture, ironically, just at the time when the executive branch of the Federal government is at last willing to accept it. Mr. Kennedy decreed last June 30 that public buildings throughout the land should henceforth represent "the finest contemporary architectural thought."

This thought was born of moral revolt against the eclectic falsification of historic architectural styles in the Victorian era. For a while, the prophets of modern architecture dogmatically banned all history and all tradition from their minds – and their schools

More timely than when it was first published —

MAY MAN PREVAIL?

"a book that should be read and pondered by every responsible citizen."*

An urgent inquiry into the facts and fictions of foreign policy—ours and theirs—**by ERICH FROMM,** world-famous psychoanalyst and author. 113,000 copies in print! $4.50 hardbound, 95¢ paperbound

DOUBLEDAY

*N. Y. Times Book Review

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of architecture. This includes Frank Lloyd Wright, who said that the only answer to the confusing ugliness of Pittsburgh was to tear down the place and start all over again.

Until recently it seemed as though the modern architectural revolution would replace the old eclectic academies with a similarly dogmatic one of its own. It has been said that the so-called "international style," with its pristine glass cages, has done just that. But this style is far from being the only manifestation of the "modern." There are, if you will, almost as many modern "styles" as there are architects. In contrast to the monotony of perpetual avant-gardist expressionist painting, our architects seem far more enthusiastically creative than their colleagues in the fine arts. Yet, their versatile work has an unmistakable common characteristic. This is not, as is often said, the use of modern structural techniques and materials. Creative architects, despite their rationalizations to the contrary, design first and then call in their engineer to figure out how to build the thing. And they are just as apt to use ancient stone and brick as modern plastics, aluminum panels, or reinforced concrete shells. The common ground, rather, remains the original moral premise that a structure ought honestly to express the purpose of a building and the manner in which it is built.

So far this premise has successfully survived the new wave of historicism which has gripped modern architecture, particularly in America. Its causes are complex. In simplest terms they can perhaps be boiled down to the realization that to be anti only – anti-ornament, anti-emotional appeal, anti-tradition – was simply boring and not necessarily functional. At any event, our most radically modern architects suddenly burst out with gay exuberance into neo-baroque, neo-classic, neo-gothic, neo-everything. Philip Johnson, for instance, who in the thirties helped bring the architectural revolution to this country and who built himself the most pristine of all pristine glassboxes, his famous house at New Canaan, now states that we cannot afford *not* to know history. He literally walked a picket line recently to save the very eclectic, very Beaux Arts Pennsylvania Station in New York. Twenty years ago he probably would have been delighted to join the wrecking crew.

The moderns discovered of late that to tear down the past and rebuild it in the image of Frank Lloyd Wright, Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius or Le Corbusier would be not only somewhat impractical but would also result in dreadful monotony. They are now leading the fight for the preservation of worthy old buildings and beginning to make an effort to honestly harmonize their own creations with those of their electic predecessors. Some good efforts in this direction have been made in a number of places, notably college campuses. Paul Rudolph's art center at Wellesley is a good example. Carl Koch's and Pietro Belluschi's new library at Bennington is probably a better one. And the late Eero Saarinen's just-about-completed dormitories at Yale may be the best yet.

Mr. Walton, having the preservation of the old Lafayette Square houses and the charm and scale of the White House front yard in mind, was thus entirely justified to recommend an architect like Warnecke for the job.

It took an unselfconscious and accomplished modern like Warnecke to restore the feeling and intent of L'Enfant along with the memories of Dolly Madison, Benjamin Tayloe, Daniel Webster, Henry Clay and Commodore Decatur and the others who once made Lafayette Square the capital's social and political center. This restoration is entirely in keeping with modern concepts of human scale in urban design. And Warnecke succeeded well in harmonizing his big office buildings with the historic residences. A *New York Times* editorial (November 4) called their design "a curiously timid modern-traditional blend." The blend is conscious, however, and, to a large degree, necessary. The traditional elements are only in the receding dark color of the brick, the proportion and dignified symmetry. The top floor bay

"A COMIC MASTERPIECE"*

MORTE D'URBAN

A NOVEL BY

J. F. POWERS

"**Morte D'Urban** is the book for which J. F. Powers' many admirers have long been waiting. It should delight them and increase their numbers."—*Evelyn Waugh*

"Crisp, bitter, hilarious throughout . . . **Morte D'Urban** may be a great work of art." —*New Republic*

"One wishes there were more, for every chapter is packed with vibrant, fully alive people, all with strong, credible feelings."—*Milwaukee Journal*

"Mr. Powers has done something amazing in this age of the symbol—brought off a genuine character, an entirely original protagonist . . . **Morte D'Urban** is a very funny book in the way that life is funny if it doesn't break your heart." —*Phyllis McGinley*

"The work of a master who has achieved virtuosity . . . a work of rare art." —*Commonweal*

"Father Urban . . . is likely to attain a permanent place in American literature." —*Chicago Tribune*

**Washington Post* $4.50

DOUBLEDAY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

windows, a typical bit of San Francisco architecture Warnecke brought along with him, will give these buildings a cheerful and original touch.

Where Warnecke's courage left him is on the Jackson Place row where he had to design new buildings directly adjacent to the old ones. The replicas are the easiest but also the phoniest way out. This is not historic restoration as in Old Williamsburg but Beaux Arts plastercasting pure and simple.

Nor is there any need to point out the anachronism of housing 20th Century office work behind the façade of 19th Century residences. Warnecke wants to preserve a modicum of the integrity of these buildings by putting small, independent agencies, such as the Fine Arts Commission into them. It might be better still, and more honest, if these houses were actually used as residences of the Vice President, say, and of the cabinet officers. For how can you preserve the "residential character" of a street without residences? The character is that of a stage set.

The matter is important because Lafayette Square is important. It can and should again become L'Enfant's pleasant and informal front door to the chief of a great as well as a modern nation. It is important, furthermore, because what we do on Lafayette Square will surely influence urban renewal elsewhere. As the President has said, "there are throughout our land specific areas and specific buildings of historical significance or architectural excellence that are threatened by [the] onward march of progress." We must preserve them. But we should not smother them in sentimental fakery.

Most important of all, the architecture of our time, with its often creative, often sensationalist experimentation and daring, must never leave the basic moral premise which inspired it: the honest expression of purpose and structure. The alternative is pastiche and Disneyland.

WOLF VON ECKARDT

ART

Drawings from Chatsworth

These are bad times for English aristocrats. It is so many centuries since they made their one contribution to man's hope by holding bad King John for downs at Runnymede that they themselves seem leftover Johannine types; and not even serious ones; reduced, rather, to playing character roles in the Wodehouse *commedia* and to exhibiting the glories of their forebears at three-and-six a look. The present Duke of Devonshire, the eleventh, is a Minister of State in Commonwealth Relations and is presumably pulling his weight in that delicate area. But if he owes his post to something other than Her Majesty's recognition of sheer merit, it is, alas, not to his ducal descent but only to the fact that he is nephew to Lady Dorothy Macmillan, wife of the Prime Minister; in the style, that is, of any Boston statesman.

Nevertheless, we are all in the deep debt of His Grace and his ten predecessors, especially the second. The National Gallery of Art in Washington has just opened "Old Master Drawings from Chatsworth," which is the stately British home of the Dukes of Devonshire in Derbyshire. The show, which will travel to five other American cities and to Ottawa, has 114 drawings from the large Devonshire Collection, brilliantly chosen to give a representative view of one of the great drawing collections and at the same time to expose the viewer to some less well known draughtsmen of great virtue and, occasionally, to some less well known aspects of the masters.

The Collection was formed by the second Duke before and after his succession in 1707. The essential purchase was that of the collection of Nicolaes Flinck, son of a pupil of Rembrandt. There have been additions, but the main contribution of the second Duke's successors has been to

THE INTELLECTUAL VERSUS THE CITY
From Thomas Jefferson to Frank Lloyd Wright
By Morton and Lucia White. Ranging from ambivalence to horror – are the reactions to urban life of Poe, Melville, the Jameses and other famous Americans. $4.95*

STREETCAR SUBURBS
By Sam B. Warner, Jr. Studying 3 early Boston suburbs (1870-1900) the author uncovers startling facts about urban growth, building patterns and the breaking down of racial and religious barriers. Illus. $5.00*
**Joint Center for Urban Studies, Harvard and M.I.T.*

THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AGENCIES
The Need for Definition of Standards
By Henry J. Friendly. An eminent jurist draws a "bill of particulars against the regulatory agenies," and urges action. The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures. $4.25

ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
By Alexander Gerschenkron. Maintaining that each nation's pattern of industrial development is "unique" a well known economist raises pertinent questions about retarded countries today.
Belknap $8.50

MISSILES AND THE REVOLUTION IN WARFARE
By Lt. Col. Nels A. Parson, Jr. A superb insider's survey (for the man in the street and the expert) of our multi-billion dollar missile program, and the impact of missiles on military operations and space exploration. Illus. $4.25

ask your bookseller

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EUROPE

An unregimented trip stressing individual freedom. Low cost yet covers all the usual plus places other tours miss. Unless the standard tour is a "must" for you, discover this unique tour before you go to Europe.
EUROPE SUMMER TOURS
255 Sequoia, Dept. N — Pasadena, California

EXPERIMENT WITH "SLEEP-LEARNING"
Self-hypnosis. Use your phonograph, recorder. Fascinating, educational. Details free.
Sleep-Learning Research Association
Box 24-NR Olympia, Washington

Be Original Buy Original
Signed Japanese brush painting; fascinating unique dragon.
10x31 $5.00 postpaid
Dragons Unlimited
Box 362, Garrett Park, Maryland

I. Q. TESTS. Accurate, inexpensive. Home-administered, professionally interpreted. Research data needed. University Testing Institute, R-24, Box 6744, Stanford, California.

PEACE IS ONLY DEFENSE AGAINST ATOM BOMBS – Envelope Stickers and Larger Ones, Post Cards, dodgers – One Cent Each. Also Bumper Strips, Badges, Posters, Large Post Cards – 10c Each. Eight other pungent Peace – Anti-War Slogans. PLENTYISM MAGAZINE (25c), 220 N.E. 57th St., Miami 37, Fla.

Do you like the candor of the European satirical magazines? Now, there is a similar American publication: *Til Eulenspiegel*. Volume I, No. 1, is on many newsstands or available for 35c from the publisher. TE, P.O. Box 1573, Chicago 90, Illinois. (A subscription to the first four issues is $1.00.)

A Perfect Gift
GOURMETS DELIGHT
Specialty Seafood Spaghetti Sauces
Lobster-Crabmeat Sauce
Shrimp Sauce
Red Clam Sauce
Simply heat and serve. Delicious on spaghetti, rice, omelets, hors d'oeuvres.
Send $2.50 for three 3/4 lb. poly-paks,
DeAngelis Food Products, Hershey, Pa.
Postage paid.

BRITISH SHOES FOR GENTLEMEN at a fraction of their American retail price! $10.95 includes duty and import charges. Delivery in ten days from receipt of order. Money back guarantee. Write for free illustrated catalogue Steven Williams, Jr., Ltd., 40 Chatham Road, Short Hills, New Jersey.

CLASSIFIED RATES

Per word (single insertion).....12c
Per word 6 times in one contract year.....11c
Per word 13 times in one contract year.....10c
Per word 26 times in one contract year.....9c
Per word 48 times in one contract year.....8c

NEW REPUBLIC
1244 Nineteenth St. N.W., Wash. 6, D.C.

hang on to his collection, a task harder now than ever: when the 10th Duke died, in 1950, his death duties were paid, in part, by drawing records of Claude and a sketchbook of Van Dyck, both of which are now in the British Museum. A few more deaths in the line and the state will have it all, an odd kind of turnabout justice, for the first Duke, the builder of Chatsworth, once held the state in his hand and delivered it to William of Orange, from the same Lowlands that produced so many of the beauties in the collection.

The show is the eighth in a series initiated in 1952 and carried on since then by Annemarie Pope of the Smithsonian Traveling Exhibition Service. For the National Gallery and for major museums in New York, Boston, Cleveland, Chicago and on to the West Coast, Mrs. Pope has assembled one masterful show after another, now based on collections, like Chatsworth, now on nations, now on individual artists, the last being Tiepolo in 1961. In all these enterprises, she has had the aid of leading drawing experts here and abroad, including, for the Chatsworth selections, Miss Elizabeth Mongan of the Rosenwald Collection at Jenkintown, Pa., and Miss Felice Stampfle of the Morgan Library, New York. With old European painting and sculpture getting ever more difficult to get out of Europe for any reason, the series has beautifully filled a gap, but the shows have had much more merit than that.

More than any other kind of art, drawing can bridge the gap between past and present attitudes toward the artist's profession. The Smithsonian's series is contributing enormously to the bridge building and the bridge building is necessary, for, whatever our romantic fancies, we cannot really be newborn. The past lives; depending on our attitude toward it, the past will either hang about our necks or support our feet; if we pretend it doesn't exist, it is much more likely to hang, a dead weight.

The Chatsworth drawings, like their predecessors in this series, offer the personal expression of a troop of Old Masters, including Raphael, Leonardo, Mantegna, Corregio, Veronese, Brueghel, Dürer, Holbein, Rubens, Rembrandt and Van Dyck. The personal note is everywhere and on all levels of significance: we see Dürer's drawing of the women's public bath and recall that the institution offered the Northerner the rare opportunity to study the nude, so essential to the mastery he consciously sought and so enviably attainable in the South. We see landscape sketches by Van Dyck and see at a glance the expressive artist behind the official portraitist: a few washes of ink and there is a house all but lost in a wood. In Raphael's sketches for works we know, we get the gratifying feeling that here we see the true artist behind the impeccable master; here is spontaneous line, here is invention, here is the hand of the artist himself, not that of the foreman of the works directing himself as he directs others to get on with the job. Similarly with Rubens, another foreman of the works, the drawings give us the artist at his task, observing and recording scenes, for the most part, of life in the country. And from this point of view the peak of the show is the superb selection of Rembrandt sketches of houses, cities in the distance, water, burgeoning trees.

Yet we deceive ourselves if we think, through the drawings, to get behind the diligent worker to the expressive spirit. The great lesson of the Chatsworth drawings is that the two are one, separable only in theory and then only with immense difficulty. The Rembrandt line varies, now thick, now thin, dark, light, quick, deliberate, clearly a direct expression of the artistic sensitivity; yet while that line is expressing that sensitivity it is all the time recording the authentic look and feel of the Lowlands; there is fidelity, "bondage" if you like, to the way the land lies. Corregio has a small, wonderfully expressive octagon of Christ in glory, with the swirl of drapery, cloud and cherubs speaking immediately of the artist's personality; yet it is angled deliberately to be seen from below and is the plan for the underside of an arch in a Parma church. At every point in the show we realize that the drawings carry their message of self-expression precisely because the artists were intensely interested in almost anything else but self-expression.

FRANK GETLEIN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Correspondence

Search for Talent

Sirs:

In his rebuttal (November 10) to my critical analysis of the use of psychological testing in industry and schools, "Search for Talent," (Oct. 1), the psychologist Bichard Barrett appears to be advancing several arugments simultaneously: first, that I am right, in that the tests do not work; that the tests do work in the hands of competent psychologists; that the need is great and that I have not offered any alternative; that the tests do not work well, so we should do less probing of the psyche and pay more attention to situational tests of performance.

Mr. Barrett was also concerned about my documentation. For a large measureful (304 pages) of this, I recommend my book (*The Brain Watchers*, $4.95, Random House). Or, more briefly, I offer the following opinions of his trusted colleagues:

Prof. John Dollard, Yale University:

"There may be exceptions unknown to me, but generally speaking, projective tests, trait scales, interest inventories or depth interviews are not proved to be useful in selecting executives, or salesmen, or potential delinquents, or superior college students."

Dr. Henry S. Dyer, Educational Testing Service:

"I take a dim view of personality tests and I think the general public is being much too frequently taken in by the mumbo-jumbo that goes with them. The inventories, the projective tests – all of them – are scarcely beyond the tea-leaf reading stage."

Dr. George K. Bennett, President of The Psychological Corporation and former president of New York State Psychological Association:

"Over the past 40 years a great number of self-descriptive inventories have been constructed and tried out. This reviewer is unable to recall a well established instance of useful validity for this class of questionnaire against a criterion of occupation success."

Space prevents my further documenting here that names given to traits cannot be trusted; that whatever personality quizzes are measuring, they are doing it badly; that we understand no more and perhaps less than before about occupational criteria; that false claims of validity are unchecked by cross validation; that there is no grounded theory of personality on which to base a test.

Martin L. Gross
New York City

Brazilian Communists

Sirs:

Even footnotes have the habit of getting into one's mouth on occasion. In your issue of November 10 you speak of the election of Miguel Arrais and call him an "avowed Communist." Marxists are as easy to find in Brazil as palm trees, but hard-core Communists are a rather rare lot. Some of those tagged as real friends really confound the press associations once in a while as Leonel Brizola did when he condemned the Russian penetration of Cuba (but, then, Carlos Lacerda, *Time's* good friend and Brazil's MacCarthy, also expropriates traction and power companies). Another carping point could be made about the description of Arrais' state as large. Populous, yes, but it's really rather small geographically. In praise, let me say that you have most often done a very good job in your coverage of that no-man's land of the American intellectual which lies to our south.

Gregory Rabassa
Assistant Professor
of Spanish and Portuguese
Columbia University

UKIYO-E ART
With authoritative articles on Ukiyo-e and other Japanese art by well-known writers.
Current issue contains 74 pages of text and 62 illustrations (hitherto unpublished).
A quarterly publication of
THE JAPAN UKIYO-E SOCIETY
Ginza Nishi 8-9
Tokyo, Japan
Sample Copy - $1.50

Any Book
Out-of-print books located—no matter how old or long out-of-print. Name the book—we'll find it for you! (Title alone is sufficient.) All authors, subjects. Fiction, nonfiction. No obligation.
Books-On-File
Dept. NEW Union City, N.J.

DEAD LETTERS SENT
Poems by
Maurice Kenny
Zymurgy Press $1.25
339 Lafayette St., N.Y.C.

LITTLE BLUE BOOKS
7 for $1.00
2,000 Titles
Free Catalogue
LARSON'S BOOKS
Box 215-A
Cannon Falls, Minn.

Want American Cents
1931-S, 1914-D, 1909-S, 1924-D
WALTON'S, 2632 Main, Alhambra, Calif.

SUMMERLANE CAMP
Combines the freedom, creativity, love and joy of Summerhill with the social ethics and strength of work communities.
Room 811, 225 Lafayette, New York 12

AMAZING RATES, MAGAZINE SUBSCRIPTIONS, RENEWALS, Box 124, Shrewsbury, New Jersey.

Small, independent, midwest research lab not involved in government work, looking for metallurgists and physical chemists with solid state experience. Also need electronics circuit designers. Send resume and references to:
Position NR, 14121 W. McNichols
Detroit 35, Michigan

L'EXPRESS
The leading liberal newspaper in France today.
Send 25c for your sample copy.
Howard Publications
Room 503
1475 Broadway
New York 36, N.Y.

"WILL FORMS"
Two Will Forms and Book on Wills.
$1.00 Complete
National Forms, Box 48313NR
Los Angeles 48, Calif.

HAVE YOU OUTGROWN GODS, SAVIORS AND SUPERNATURALISM?
Is all your concern for people? Then you're a HUMANIST! Welcome to AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION; local chapters, publications. Send $1 for three-month trial membership ($5 for year):
AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION
Dept. NR, Yellow Springs, Ohio

Printed by National Publishing Co., 502 N St., N.E., Washington 2, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Because of the extensive and many ways unique coverage we have given the Cuba story, we think *Nation* readers know more about that country than most Americans. Twice we scooped the world press: Nov. 20, 1957, we printed the program for a "socialized" Cuba written by Castro while he was still an outlaw in the Sierra Maestra; Nov. 19, 1960, we revealed the existence of a CIA base in Guatemala for training a Cuban invasion force.

But in a broader sense, all of our coverage of Cuba has been of the "scoop" variety because of the stress on developments generally ignored elsewhere. Our early stories by Carleton Beals—four in 1959, two more in 1960—were models of firsthand reporting by the dean of all American commentators on Latin America. In 1960, we published Barbara Deming's "Dialogues in Cuba," an unusually moving account of the Cuban people under the new regime, and two hard-hitting reports on the beginnings of the economic war on Cuba ("Sugar and Sympathy," by Boris Swerling, a Stanford University economist, and "The Politics of Sugar," by Stanley Meisler, a Washington newspaperman).

Early in 1961, Don Dwiggins, aviation editor of the Los Angeles *Mirror*, gave further details of the Guatemalan invasion base in "Guatemala's Secret Airstrip." The same year, Leo Huberman, co-editor of *The Monthly Review*, contributed "Eyewitness in Havana"; Richard Seaver, a Grove Press editor, took apart some warmongering American columnists in "Typewriter Commandos"; and Ronald Hilton, director of the Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies at Stanford University, contributed an important political commentary, "The Cuban Trap."

This year, in the months preceding the October crisis—a period when no American newsmen were getting visas for Cuba—we nevertheless presented three outstanding on-the-spot reports from that country: "Cuba Today," by Samuel Shapiro of the Michigan State University history faculty (quickly sold out on the newsstands), and "Labor in Cuba" and "Castro and Cuba's Communists," by Maurice Zeitlin, Princeton University sociologist.

As this is written, the Cuba story bids fair to merge into the broader problem of an East-West détente on disarmament. For this eventuality, Nation readers are doubly armed; for, along with Cuba, peace and disarmament have been—and will continue to be—a chief preoccupation of

THE NATION

THE NATION, 333 Sixth Avenue, New York 14
Please send THE NATION

☐ One Year, $8 ☐ Three Years, $20
☐ Two Years, $14 ☐ 6 Months, $4
☐ Payment enclosed ☐ Bill me

(Foreign & Canadian postage $1 a year extra)

NAME_____
ADDRESS_____
CITY_____ ZONE____ STATE_____
NR-3

cuba

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED